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INTRODUCTION 
In the comparatively simple world of the nineteenth century, the final 
judgment rule worked reasonably well as a means of regulating access to 
appellate review.1  Much civil litigation involved two opposing parties and 
many cases went to trial, usually before a jury.2  The final judgment rule de-
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1  The final judgment rule appeared in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a limitation both on appellate re-
view in the federal system and on Supreme Court review of state court decisions.  See Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, §§ 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 84, 85 (allowing review of “final decrees and judgments” of the fed-
eral district courts and review by writ of error of a “final judgment or decree” of the state courts).  The 
Judiciary Act applied the final judgment rule to both of the two most common modes of appellate re-
view—writ of error review for judgments at common law and review by way of appeal for decrees in 
equity and admiralty.  See generally ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2d ed. 1989) (describing modern practice with respect to the final judgment rule); Carleton M. Crick, 
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932) (tracing the origins and operation of 
the rule in the early republic). 
2  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462–63 tbl.1 (2004) (finding that civil trials de-
clined from 11.5% of dispositions in 1962 to 1.8% of dispositions in 2002 and that civil jury trials de-
clined from 5.5% of dispositions in 1962 to 1.2% in 2002). 
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ferred appellate oversight until the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s 
verdict3 (except in the rare cases that warranted supervisory review through 
mandamus or other common law writs).4  Parties focused their efforts on 
winning the trial in the district court and sought review only when errors 
appeared on the record.5  The common law writ of error, the preferred ve-
hicle for securing appellate review of jury verdicts in the federal system, 
limited review to issues of law and preserved the jury’s role in the determi-
nation of factual questions.6 
Two centuries on, much has changed.  Today, many questions that ju-
ries once decided have been transformed into issues of law.7  Such ques-
tions no longer disappear into the black box of jury deliberations; instead, 
they persistently reappear in petitions for appellate review.8  In addition, 
modern litigation has grown a good deal more complex and variegated; 
complaints identify more parties and more theories of recovery and often 
reach across borders to bring nonresident defendants before the court.9  
 
3  The current statement of the rule continues to reflect this emphasis on finality.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States . . . .”); id. § 1295 (stating that the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over final decisions arising un-
der certain subject matter, including patents, and final decisions of specific federal courts, such as the 
United States Court of Federal Claims); 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
§ 202.02–.04 (3d ed. 1997). 
4  For an overview of the nature and origins of the supervisory writs, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdic-
tion-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433 
(2000); see also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.06 (noting that such writs were available under 
“extraordinary circumstances” to review pretrial orders). 
5  See 8 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 39App.100 (stating that, at common law, “a writ of error re-
viewed only questions of law appearing on the face of the record”). 
6  See id. (explaining that a common law writ of error, absent legislation, was unavailable to secure 
review even of questions of fact raised in a bench trial). 
7  See infra Part I.C.4.  In the 1980s, Professor Martin Louis noted a similar concern with the rise of 
decisions that combine questions of fact and law, or “ultimate facts.”  Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adju-
dicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the 
Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1002 
(1986).  Professor Louis noted that some ultimate facts have been designated questions of law because 
they are “regarded as too sensitive or too important to be entrusted to juries.”  Id. at 1004.  Although 
Professor Louis considered the ability to reclassify questions of fact into questions of law as “a sword 
that appellate judges wear but seldom actually draw,” id. at 1028–29, it seems that they have now begun 
to wield it with greater frequency. 
8  Two examples of what we call “judicialization” (the judicial transformation of factual questions 
into legal questions) are the construction of patent claims under Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 
517 U.S. 370 (1996), and the evaluation of expert witnesses under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceut-
icals, Inc., 509 U.S. 529 (1993).  See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (“[C]laim construction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal.”); 
Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the Daubert framework for the ad-
missibility of expert testimony is subject to de novo review in the courts of appeals). 
9  See RICHARD L. MARCUS, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, COMPLEX 
LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 2–7 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing 
“The Metamorphosis of Litigation”); Daniel J. Meador, A Perspective on Change in the Litigation Sys-
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With this growth in the size and complexity of litigation, modern procedur-
al systems now provide managerial judges, extensive discovery, and oppor-
tunities for motion practice that substantially define the contours of the 
claims and the prospects for recovery.10  Rising settlement rates, either 
through negotiation or alternative forms of dispute resolution, indicate that 
fewer cases go to trial today as a percentage of those filed in federal court.11 
With the growing influence of managerial judges, the transformation of 
questions of fact into questions of law, and the rise of settlement, the final 
judgment rule and its existing exceptions no longer provide an entirely sa-
tisfactory trigger for the exercise of appellate oversight.12  While the re-
quirement of a final order continues to control the timing of the review of 
most actions for damages, pressure for expanded interlocutory review has 
led to a variety of important changes.13  Thus, Congress has expanded inter-
 
tem, 49 ALA. L. REV. 7 (1997) (discussing developments in the litigation system that have made litiga-
tion more complex). 
10  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982) (describing a 
growing judicial role in supervising case preparation and encouraging settlement); see also DAVID F. 
HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 1 (4th ed. 2008) (noting the increased respon-
sibilities placed on trial judges by, among other things, Daubert and Markman); Abram Chayes, The 
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1285–1304  (1976)  (discussing 
changes in the role of the judge since the nineteenth century). 
11  See Galanter, supra note 2, at 515–16 (suggesting the rise in settlements as one reason for the de-
cline in trials); see also Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of 
the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005) (exploring reasons why federal trials are decreasing 
as well as possible implications of the decrease).  But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials 
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Fed-
eral Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 711–12 (2004) (noting the possibility that the set-
tlement rate dropped between 1970 and 2000).  For reasons why parties might settle, rather than proceed 
to trial, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which mandates that if an offer of judgment by a party is 
rejected by the opposing party, that opposing party will be liable for some court costs if the ultimate 
judgment obtained at trial is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, and Marc Galanter & Mia 
Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 
1340 (1994), which notes the ways in which parties are encouraged to settle.  But see Robert G. Bone, 
“To Encourage Settlement”: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2008) (challenging the “universally accepted [view] that 
Rule 68 is meant to encourage settlements”). 
12  See Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of Non-final Or-
ders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (1999); Timothy P. Glynn, Discon-
tent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175 
(2001); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong 
Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of 
Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 357 (proposing that the Federal Circuit “be more re-
ceptive to adjudicating interlocutory orders arising from Markman hearings”); Martin H. Redish, The 
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975); Michael E. 
Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 
(1990); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007). 
13  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 168–69 (proposing a statutory change similar to what was lat-
er adopted as 28 U.S.C § 1292(e) (2006)); see also, e.g., Redish, supra note 12, at 91–92 (arguing that 
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locutory review directly by authorizing district courts to certify “controlling 
question[s] of law” to the appellate courts for immediate review.14  Con-
gress has also acted indirectly to authorize federal rulemakers to craft new 
rules for expanded interlocutory review.15  Federal rulemakers,16 for their 
part, have been slow to embrace this new delegation of authority; appellate 
courts conduct discretionary review of class certification decisions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 but have not otherwise been given 
broader rule-based authority.17 
 
the current exceptions to the finality rule “do not adequately serve the interests of justice in many in-
stances”). 
14  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.31 (laying out the require-
ments for discretionary appeal).  Section 1292(b) allows the district court to certify appeals to the courts 
of appeals when the “order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground 
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation.”  § 1292(b).  The appellate court, however, has the discretion to deny 
such appeals “for any reason, including docket congestion.”  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 475 (1978).  Section 1292(b) suffers, therefore, from the issue of double discretion, requiring the 
district court and appellate court to agree on the need for immediate review.  Appellate courts have been 
reluctant to take appeals under § 1292(b).  See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (declaring that immediate appellate review under § 1292(b) is rarely granted); Horwitz v. Al-
loy Auto. Co., 957 F.2d 1431, 1438 (7th Cir. 1992) (recounting a colloquy between the district judge 
and the parties where the judge lamented that he “can never get the Seventh Circuit to take an interlocu-
tory appeal” under § 1292(b) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) after trying “many, many times”); 
see also Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of Circuit Court Gatekeeping Decisions, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
129, 149 (2010) (explaining that circuit court law regarding threshold gatekeeping appears to influence 
judges’ votes on threshold issues); Solimine, supra note 12, at 1201 (reporting that the high refusal rate 
of courts of appeals to provide review “reflects a high level of reluctance to utilize section 1292(b) ap-
peals”).  Noting that review of orders certified under § 1292(b) is “surprisingly low,” Professor Timothy 
Glynn has suggested that § 1292(b) be amended to provide for appellate acceptance of certified appeals 
unless certification constitutes abuse of discretion by the district court.  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 
246, 259. 
15  28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (“The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in accordance with section 2072 
of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not oth-
erwise provided for . . . .”); see also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.34[1] & n.1 (noting that 
§ 1292(e) is a constitutional delegation of rulemaking power because it allows the Supreme Court to de-
fine “when appeals may be taken, which is an issue apart from the [congressional] power to confer orig-
inal jurisdiction on the lower federal courts” (citing Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 973–
74 (5th Cir. 2000))); Laura J. Hines, Mirroring or Muscling: An Examination of State Class Action Ap-
pellate Rulemaking, 58 KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010) (recognizing that § 1292(e) “laid the foundation 
for the only exercise of this new rulemaking authority thus far, Rule 23(f)”); Steinman, supra note 12, at 
1246 (“This rulemaking authority has remained largely dormant . . . .”). 
16  The Rules Enabling Act empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, subject 
to congressional review.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.  The statute further directs the Judicial Conference to 
assign rulemaking responsibility to a standing committee and to various subcommittees, comprised of 
members of the bench and bar.  Id. § 2073.  Pursuant to these statutes, federal rulemakers develop rules 
at the subcommittee level, subject to review by the standing committee and the Judicial Conference, and 
eventual review and promulgation by the Supreme Court. 
17  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 203.34 (describing discre-
tionary interlocutory appeals based on Supreme Court-prescribed rules); 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802.2 (3d ed. 2005) 
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The Supreme Court has played a role in opening new avenues to inter-
locutory review as well.  For a time, the Court broadened the collateral or-
der doctrine,18 which allows interlocutory review of issues that the Court 
deems both relatively important and relatively distinct from the merits-
based questions that normally come to appellate courts after a final judg-
ment, to include such issues as sovereign immunity,19 official immunity,20 
and some remand orders.21  In addition, the Court has fashioned significant 
exceptions to statutory provisions that would otherwise foreclose interlocu-
 
(describing the appealability of class certification under Rule 23(f)).  Rule 23(f) provides that the court 
of appeals “may permit” interlocutory review of an order granting or denying class action certification.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  The courts of appeals, however, have been reluctant to exercise this authority.  
See Sumitomo Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 137–40 (2d Cir. 2001) (de-
scribing requirements for the interlocutory review of class certification rulings and positing that they 
“will rarely be met”); Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Dis-
cretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 284 (2008) (noting, based on the findings of an empir-
ical study, that “it does not appear that the courts are accepting most [Rule 23(f)] petitions”).  The 
Second Circuit’s response to Rule 23(f) in Sumitomo Copper shows some problems with allowing unfet-
tered discretionary review over a narrow area of concern.  Accord Glynn, supra note 12, at 250–58 (dis-
cussing problems with discretionary review).  Even as the rulemakers express a desire for increased 
supervision over a specific area of law, the courts of appeals hesitate to provide that supervision.  For 
example, the rulemakers specifically distinguished Rule 23(f) from certified appeals under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) in that appeals under Rule 23(f) do not need to involve a controlling question of unsettled law.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note; see also Hines, supra note 15, at 1030–35 (summariz-
ing the history of Rule 23(f)).  The Second Circuit, however, in line with other circuits, restored such a 
requirement by requiring either “(1) that the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation 
and there has been a substantial showing that the district court’s decision is questionable, or (2) that the 
certification order implicates a legal question about which there is a compelling need for immediate res-
olution.”  Sumitomo Copper, 262 F.3d at 139. 
18  The Court originally applied the collateral order doctrine in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., in which it found a decision was final because it fell into a class of decisions that “finally deter-
mine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred 
until the whole case is adjudicated.”  337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  While the collateral order doctrine pro-
vides for review that appears to be interlocutory in nature, it “is not considered an exception to the final 
judgment rule, but rather a practical construction of the rule.”  19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, 
§ 202.07[1] (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994), and Cohen, 
337 U.S. 541). 
19  See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). 
20  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that a defendant can immediately ap-
peal a district court’s denial of his qualified official immunity from Bivens liability). 
21  See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) (holding that a stay order 
under the Colorado River abstention doctrine was appealable under the collateral order doctrine).  Re-
cently, however, the Court has begun to apply the doctrine more narrowly.  See Will v. Hallock, 
546 U.S. 345 (2006) (holding that the doctrine does not apply to an order denying a motion to dismiss 
on Federal Tort Claims Act judgment bar grounds); Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 865 (holding that 
the collateral order doctrine does not apply to the refusal to give effect to a settlement agreement).  In 
the most recent case on the issue, the Court has indicated that it is unlikely to expand the collateral order 
doctrine further.  See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (stating that the doc-
trine does not apply to a disclosure order involving information protected by the attorney–client privi-
lege). 
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tory review of certain orders.  For example, the Court has ruled that the flat 
ban on interlocutory review of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) does 
not bar all such appellate review.22  As a result of the departure from this 
bright-line rule, the Court has frequently struggled to define access to ap-
pellate review of remand orders.23 
Noting the Court’s efforts to define its parameters, scholars have sug-
gested a variety of competing approaches to delineate the proper scope of 
interlocutory review.24  Taking a pragmatic approach to appellate review, 
Professor Martin Redish argues that courts should weigh the likely costs of 
deferring review against the benefits that immediate review can provide.25  
Professor Redish rightly notes that interlocutory appellate review can some-
times correct serious mistakes at the trial level and thus avoid the costs as-
sociated with an unnecessary trial.26  On the other hand, interlocutory 
review can result in appellate oversight that fails to address any serious er-
rors and serves only to delay the ultimate resolution of the claim.  Professor 
Edward Cooper, among others, has expressed some support for a regime of 
measured discretionary review, in which courts would gain greater discre-
tion as they gain competence.27  Similarly, the approach of the American 
 
22  See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12 (noting that § 1447(d) only bars appellate review of re-
mands based on § 1447(c)). 
23  Compare Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) (holding that a 
district court’s remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is barred from appellate review by 
§ 1447(d)), with Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009) (allowing appellate 
review of a remand order after a district court declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim).  
For an assessment of developments and a suggested solution, see James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of 
Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493 
(2011). 
24  See supra note 12 (citing sources). 
25  Redish, supra note 12, at 98–101. 
26  Id. at 98; see also Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 157, 157 (describing the potentially “serious conse-
quences” of postponing review of a trial court ruling, including the possibility that “an error may so taint 
subsequent proceedings as to require reversal and further proceedings [that] may not only represent an 
expensive duplication of effort, but may themselves be distorted beyond repair by the events of the first 
trial”).  The effects of delay may, in fact, go beyond the particular dispute.  See id. at 158 (noting that an 
unreviewed incorrect trial court ruling may be “dissipated” by further trial court proceedings and that the 
“appellate courts may be deprived of the opportunity to clarify and improve the law on matters that re-
peatedly evade review”). 
27  See Cooper, supra note 26.  Cooper argues that, without “mature[]” judicial institutions, especial-
ly at the district court level, rules that provide for as-of-right interlocutory review may be necessary, 
even if those rules are extremely complex.  Id. at 157–58.  But at some point these doctrines may be-
come “so complex and so shifting that they cannot be contained in any set of elaborate rules,” so we 
should consider whether “our institutions have matured to the point at which discretion can be substi-
tuted for some part of the rules.”  Id. at 158.  Professor Cooper also argues that the courts’ discretion 
over interlocutory appealability should reflect the quality of the judiciary at each level.  See id. at 158–
59.  If trial judges show themselves to be “much like appellate judges in ability and temperament,” they 
might view “appellate judges as a resource to be invoked whenever immediate review promises to facili-
tate the speediest, most just, and most efficient disposition of litigation.”  Id. at 159. 
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Bar Association (ABA), which has been codified in Wisconsin28 and has 
gained support from scholars such as Professor Robert Martineau,29 gives 
the appellate courts discretion to hear nonfinal orders if the appeal will 
“(i) [m]aterially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further 
proceedings; (ii) [p]rotect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or 
(iii) [c]larify an issue of general public importance in the administration of 
justice.”30 
Other scholars, by contrast, have defended a categorical approach to 
interlocutory review.31  Rather than relying on the exercise of case-by-case 
discretion, these scholars argue that the system of interlocutory review 
should attempt to identify specific orders that warrant review in every 
case.32  Orders falling within the scope of these previously defined catego-
ries would thus trigger interlocutory review as of right and would not re-
 
28  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03 (West Supp. 1992). 
29  Professor Martineau has argued against expanding the exceptions to the finality requirement by 
rule and in favor of wide-ranging discretion in the appellate courts to accept or reject interlocutory ap-
peals.  See Martineau, supra note 12, at 748–70.  He has specifically endorsed the approach of the 
ABA’s Standards Relating to Appellate Courts.  Id. at 776.  The ABA approach has also been supported 
by others as the best approach to interlocutory review.  See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 
297–99; John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discre-
tionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 201 (1994). 
30  STANDARDS RELATING TO APP. CTS. § 3.12 (1994).  Although the factors for interlocutory appeal 
are similar to those of § 1292(b), there are three important differences.  First, they are disjunctive re-
quirements, so interlocutory review can be granted if any individual factor is satisfied.  Second, they in-
clude a broad factor relating to irreparable harm.  Third, they do not require the district court to certify 
the appeal, placing all of the discretion in the hands of the appellate court.  The assignment of such 
wide-ranging discretion to the courts of appeals, however, poses two problems.  First, it does not address 
the reluctance of appellate courts to provide interlocutory review.  See supra note 14.  Second, decisions 
rejecting immediate review may not give future litigants enough clarification about when interlocutory 
review will be allowed.  See, e.g., K.W. v. Banas, 529 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting 
interlocutory review without any explanation except that “the court concludes that the petition does not 
meet the criteria for granting permissive appeal”). 
31  Professor Glynn, for example, has recommended that the rulemakers provide for interlocutory re-
view of “problem areas” where the lack of interlocutory review (1) has left the law “unclear or underde-
veloped” and (2) “inflict[s] some kind of severe irreparable harm” on one of the parties.  See Glynn, 
supra note 12, at 259.  Professor Paul Carrington has suggested a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals 
Act, which takes a threefold approach to revising interlocutory review that relies heavily on the categor-
ical approach.  Carrington, supra note 13, at 166–69.  First, his proposed act would tighten the final 
judgment rule by making a final decision one “set forth on a separate document . . . manifesting the in-
tent of the district court that proceedings in the case be thereby terminated save for the taxation of costs 
or enforcement proceedings, and entered on the docket of the district court.”  Id. at 167.  Second, he 
proposed a statutory revision similar to that eventually adopted in § 1292(e) that “makes explicit that the 
rulemaking power does extend to the specification of appealable interlocutory decisions.”  Id. at 168.  
Third, the act would explicitly allow for interlocutory review where it is “essential to protect substantial 
rights which cannot be effectively enforced on review after final decision.”  Id. at 167.  The purpose of 
this last revision is to eliminate the “necessity for strained interpretations of finality . . . and the use of 
extraordinary writs . . . as an alternative to appeal.”  Id. at 168. 
32  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259–61. 
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quire any extended case-by-case analysis at the jurisdictional threshold.33  
This categorical approach resembles the Supreme Court’s collateral order 
doctrine, which provides as-of-right interlocutory review of orders falling 
within its scope.34  The Court’s categorical thinking comes through quite 
clearly in its decisions: it has reminded us that collateral order analysis 
should focus not on “individualized jurisdictional” issues35 but on “the en-
tire category to which a claim belongs.”36  Scholars who support the cate-
gorical approach often propose to rely on rulemakers to identify relatively 
discrete orders for which the costs and benefits favor immediate review.  
For example, both Professor Paul Carrington and the American Law Insti-
tute’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project would rely on the rulemakers 
to identify the categories of orders to which interlocutory review applies.37  
Similarly, Professor Timothy Glynn has suggested that the rulemakers 
should identify “problem areas” and create rules to allow interlocutory re-
view in those narrow areas.38 
Critics of the categorical approach have expressed deep skepticism 
about the prospects for developing a set of criteria with which to identify 
proper subjects for interlocutory review.39  Professors Howard Eisenberg 
and Alan Morrison doubt that the rulemakers can identify orders by catego-
ry that will always warrant interlocutory review.40  Experience with the col-
lateral order doctrine tends to bear out this contention; the recognition of a 
 
33  For criticisms of threshold evaluation of the propriety of an appeal, see Carrington, supra note 13, 
at 170, which notes that the law treating ripeness and timeliness of appeals as jurisdictional precursors to 
appellate review is “a fetish which serves no significant systemic interest,” and Glynn, supra note 12, at 
262–63, which proposes an abuse of discretion standard for courts of appeals’ determinations whether to 
grant review of or dismiss appeals from class certification orders. 
34  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 192–93 (describing the collateral order doctrine and the categories of 
cases to which it applies); supra note 21 and accompanying text.  Because the orders considered appeal-
able under the collateral order doctrine are treated as final, litigants receive review as a matter of right.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
35  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978). 
36  Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). 
37  See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 463–65, 495 (2004) (recom-
mending a revised 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) that would give rulemakers control over when to allow appellate 
review over remand orders); Carrington, supra note 13.  The American Law Institute’s commentary on 
the proposed removal statute explains that the rulemakers are in the best position to provide the needed 
“flexibility” by not requiring statutory amendment.  AM. LAW INST., supra, at 495.  The American Law 
Institute project retains, however, a measure of discretionary review for extraordinary cases.  Id. (prec-
luding as-of-right review but leaving appellate courts to use extraordinary writs to review remand orders 
“free of any putative restriction”). 
38  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 259–62. 
39  See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 296–97 (expressing concern that criteria would be 
both broad and vague).  Professors Eisenberg and Morrison make the additional point that appellate 
courts might construe jurisdictional grants narrowly, allowing, in effect, for discretionary denial of the 
appeal.  Id. 
40  See id. at 295 (identifying areas of disagreement about when to allow interlocutory review). 
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right to interlocutory review can attract some relatively dubious appeals.41  
Similarly, the Court’s categorical approach to the interlocutory review of 
remand orders can sometimes result in the review of matters that many ob-
servers, including the Justices themselves, would not regard as worthy can-
didates for appellate intervention.42  Their skepticism about the ability of 
rulemakers to define clear categories of deserving orders has prompted Pro-
fessors Eisenberg and Morrison, along with other scholars such as Professor 
Michael Solimine, to join in the call for review based on the exercise of dis-
cretion.43  Like Professors Redish and Cooper, these scholars turn to judicial 
discretion as the best means of weeding out routine and undeserving ap-
peals. 
Apart from questions about the proper balance between categorical 
rules and discretionary standards, debates over interlocutory review feature 
widespread disagreement about who should fashion and apply the rules.  At 
various times, Congress, courts, and rulemakers have all taken responsibili-
ty for crafting rules of interlocutory review.44  The rules differ not only in 
their institutional origins but also in the level of the court system that takes 
the lead in determining the existence of appellate jurisdiction.  In some cas-
es, the district courts can exercise discretionary control over appellate re-
view, perhaps by entering a partial summary judgment under Rule 54 and 
finding no just cause for delay.45  In other cases, discretionary review re-
quires combined action at both the district and circuit court levels; section 
1292(b) certifications fall into this category.46  Finally, some forms of inter-
 
41  See Pfander, supra note 23, at 504–05 (noting the growth in appeals from remand orders); see al-
so Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1869 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting 
that interlocutory review is available for district court decisions to retain cases that have no federal law 
issues even though such a decision “rarely involves major legal questions, and that (even if wrong) a dis-
trict court decision of this kind will not often have major adverse consequences”). 
42  See Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1869 (Breyer, J. concurring) (noting that “something is wrong” when, 
as appears to be the case in the context of remand orders under § 1447, review is permitted “in an in-
stance where that decision is unlikely to be wrong and where a wrong decision is unlikely to work se-
rious harm” but forbidden “in an instance where that decision may well be wrong and where a wrong 
decision could work considerable harm”). 
43  See Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12; Solimine, supra note 12. 
44  See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing the congressional implementation of 
§ 1292(b)); supra note 17 and accompanying text (explaining the interlocutory review of class certifica-
tion created by rulemakers); supra notes 21, 34 and accompanying text (describing the judicial creation 
of the collateral order doctrine). 
45  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (allowing the district court, when it determines that there is no just rea-
son for delay, to enter “final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties,” thereby 
triggering the opportunity for appellate review); 10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23.  For an argu-
ment favoring district court discretion over appellate review of orders compelling arbitration, see Pierre 
H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction over Orders Com-
pelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1392–94 (2002). 
46  See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 37, § 3.12 cmt. 
(explaining that § 1292(b) requires “concurrent permission” of the trial and appellate courts).  Professor 
Solimine argues for an increased use of § 1292(b), especially in complex litigation such as mass torts.  
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locutory review, such as class action certification review47 and mandamus 
review,48 require only that the appellate court agree to hear the matter.49 
Recent developments at the Supreme Court suggest that the debate 
over how to structure interlocutory review may be coming to a head.  In 
Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., the Court approved yet another 
exception to § 1447(d)’s prohibition against review of remand orders.50  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer posed sharp questions about the Court’s 
handling of the doctrine.51  In particular, he questioned rules that seemingly 
authorized review of mundane problems yet foreclosed review of more se-
rious issues.52  He ended his opinion with a call for help from “experts.”53  
 
Solimine, supra note 12, at 1208–09.  Professor Solimine views § 1292(b) as an underused “safety 
valve” of interlocutory review, which the appellate courts have reserved for use in “big cases.”  Id. at 
1167, 1204.  He believes that if the statute were “shorn of the ‘big case’ requirement” it could provide 
the needed flexibility without overly burdening the courts of appeals.  Id. at 1168. 
47  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification . . . .”); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the 
circuit courts’ treatment of Rule 23(f)). 
48  See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (stating that federal courts “may issue all writs necessary or appro-
priate in aid of their respective jurisdictions”); see also 19 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 204.01[2][c] 
(stating that mandamus is included within “all writs” and “is generally used to prevent district judges 
from exceeding their authority”); Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 84–85 (describing the “supervisory” use of mandamus).  
Professor Melissa Waters has argued for an expanded use of mandamus to supervise district courts that 
act more like courts of equity when dealing with mass torts.  Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in 
an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 
591–602 (2002).  Although Professor Waters’s approach would allow greater discretionary oversight, it 
raises questions.  First, mandamus originated as a tool for correction of jurisdictional and procedural is-
sues and has been thought less appropriate for a full consideration of the merits of a decision.  See 
Pfander, supra note 4.  Second, reliance on mandamus does not take advantage of the strength of the dis-
trict court in evaluating the need for interlocutory review.  See Glynn, supra note 12, at 263 (“[A] dis-
trict court judge is in the best position to determine whether an order is worthy of appellate review.”).  
Professor Waters nicely captures the interesting connection between equity and interlocutory review, 
noting that the finality rule did not historically apply to courts of equity.  Waters, supra, at 533; see also 
Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory Restatement, supra, at 82 (“[T]he finality re-
quirement was never well established in equity.”). 
49  Professor Adam Steinman has argued that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, allows not only 
for discretionary writs of mandamus but for discretionary appeals as well.  See Steinman, supra note 15, 
at 1267–68.  He further suggests that interlocutory review under the All Writs Act would “situate all in-
terlocutory appeals on a more solid textual and doctrinal footing.”  Id. at 1295. 
50  129 S. Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009) (concluding that a district court’s discretionary decision to remand 
after declining supplemental jurisdiction is not a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
does not implicate the ban on review of remand orders in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)–(d)). 
51  Id. at 1869 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra notes 41–42. 
52  129 S. Ct. at 1869 (Breyer, J., concurring) (comparing Carlsbad, which allowed review of wheth-
er remand was proper after all federal law issues were dismissed from a case, a decision that “rarely in-
volves major legal questions,” with Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224 
(2007), which refused to allow review of remand that “presented a difficult legal question involving the 
commercial activities of a foreign sovereign”). 
53  Id. at 1869–70. 
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Similarly, in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, the Court took an ex-
ceedingly narrow view of the propriety of fashioning new judge-made rules 
of interlocutory review through the expansion of the collateral order doc-
trine.54  The skeptical assessment in the majority opinion was echoed and 
underscored in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which proclaimed a 
more absolutist opposition to judge-made interlocutory review.55  Together, 
the opinions suggest the emergence of a fairly strong preference for the de-
velopment of rules through the rulemaking process. 
In this Article, we propose a rule of interlocutory review that secures 
the benefits of both discretion and categorization while eliminating many of 
their drawbacks.56  In brief, we propose a rule that would empower the par-
ties, by consent, to request the district court to certify a question for interlo-
cutory review.57  If the district court approved the joint request, the party 
contesting the district court’s order could appeal the certified question 
without first having to secure leave from the appellate court.  Such a con-
sensual trigger for interlocutory review would rely on the self-interest of the 
parties to identify district court decisions that warrant immediate review.  
Not every district court order would attract the consent of the parties, need-
less to say.  Indeed, we will explore a variety of situations in which the par-
ties will predictably disagree about the wisdom of immediate appellate 
review.  But the parties do have obvious financial incentives to weigh the 
costs of going to trial in light of the risk and expense associated with both 
pre- and post-trial appellate reversal.  Self-interest would encourage the par-
ties to identify situations where expected trial costs are high and where the 
risks of post-trial appellate court invalidation of the trial court’s interlocuto-
ry disposition are significant.  In such cases, both parties might well prefer 
appellate review sooner rather than later.  Instead of trying to specify these 
deserving orders in advance, we propose to rely on the parties to cull them 
from the litigation process.  Furthermore, the requirement that the district 
court certify the appeal would allow the district judge to maintain some 
control of the litigation by rejecting potentially disruptive repetitive review 
 
54  130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (stressing that the collateral order doctrine is an exception that should 
not “swallow the general rule,” that there should be a single appeal from a final judgment, and that the 
“justification for immediate appeal must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits 
of deferring appeal until litigation concludes” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 
U.S. 863, 868 (1994) in first quotation)). 
55  Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that applying 
the collateral order doctrine, even to find that the order does not fall within it, “needlessly perpetuates a 
judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit”). 
56  As explained below, we recommend use of the rulemaking process as the vehicle for implement-
ing our proposal because it offers the possibility of ongoing evaluation.  See infra Part II. 
57  Such a rule would be authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), which allows the creation of a rule 
“to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise pro-
vided for.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006).  In other words, we are not proposing that parties be allowed to 
consent to finality but instead that they be permitted to consent to the review of an interlocutory deci-
sion. 
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and screening out cases in which she feels the decision might be modified 
as the proceedings continue.58 
Our proposal to provide a new, independent basis for interlocutory ap-
pellate review would allow the parties to evaluate the economics of their 
case in deciding whether to agree to appellate review and would add some-
thing valuable to the modes of interlocutory review now available.  For 
starters, our proposal would operate as a matter of right, thus avoiding the 
expense associated with litigation at the appellate court level over the exis-
tence of appellate jurisdiction.  In addition, our proposal would rely on the 
parties to identify situations in which immediate review can cost-effectively 
advance the resolution of the case.  Happily, the parties’ incentives would 
often lead them to take account of the same factors that would presumably 
inform an attempt on the part of the rulemakers to establish categories for 
interlocutory review.  But instead of a rigid system of categories, with in-
evitable problems of over- and underinclusiveness, the system we envision 
would allow the parties to tailor the timing of appellate review to suit their 
own situation.  We do not view party autonomy as a solution to every prob-
lem of appellate oversight and do not advocate its adoption to the exclusion 
of other forms.  But we do think it would add something valuable to the 
tools of interlocutory review now available. 
Our approach relies on two insights not currently reflected in the appel-
late review literature.  First, our approach hypothesizes that appellate re-
view can reduce the systemic costs of dispute resolution, even when the 
district court does not make a clear error in resolving a potentially decisive 
legal issue.  In discussions of pragmatic review, scholars treat appellate re-
view as cost-effective in cases in which the district court has made a clear 
mistake that would require trial of a case that should have been dismissed.59  
But we suggest that even close cases may benefit from interlocutory review 
because clarifying a potentially controlling legal question can avoid trial 
costs no matter how the appellate court rules on the merits.  Second, our 
approach draws on the insight that we can rely on the parties to identify or-
ders that meet the close-question test for interlocutory review.  The combi-
nation of party consent and district court review can thus identify a 
 
58  In addition, district court certification would ensure that “feigned cases” are weeded out.  See in-
fra Part II.B. 
59  See Cooper, supra note 26, at 157 (recognizing that if an error is not immediately reviewed it may 
“so taint subsequent proceedings as to require reversal and further proceedings”); Redish, supra note 12, 
at 98 (“For example, a trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment, or to deny removal from a state 
court, may require the parties to expend substantial physical, financial and emotional effort in the prepa-
ration and conduct of a trial which may later prove to have been worthless.”); Amy E. Sloan, Appellate 
Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 43, 53–54 
(2005) (noting how immediate review of a controlling question of law under § 1292(b) can be efficient 
because “an error in the application of a controlling question of law results in wasted resources”); Soli-
mine, supra note 12, at 1169 (noting that interlocutory review “can save cost and time by shortening, 
streamlining or terminating the litigation”). 
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category of interlocutory orders for which review makes sense.60  We would 
thus eliminate the traditional requirement that the appellate court indepen-
dently agree to hear the appeal.61  By eliminating such threshold review, our 
proposal should further reduce the systemic cost of dispute resolution.62 
Our proposal differs in important respects from those put forward by 
other scholars.  Professor Carrington has argued that the parties should be 
allowed to waive a defect in jurisdiction, thus envisioning “appellate juris-
diction conferred by consent of the parties.”63  Though this does involve the 
aspect of consent,64 Carrington’s proposal, unlike ours, allows for consent to 
overcome defects in other modes of review and does not provide an inde-
pendent basis for interlocutory appellate review.  In a different vein, Profes-
sor Glynn has suggested an amendment to § 1292(b) to require the courts of 
appeals to hear certified appeals absent abuse of discretion by the district 
court.65  In some ways, our proposal is more modest in that with most 
§ 1292(b) appeals one party opposes the certification.  We are suggesting 
 
60  This insight addresses the concern raised regarding the categorical approach to interlocutory re-
view that “any . . . criteria that could be devised [for interlocutory review] are, of necessity, both quite 
broad and quite vague.”  Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 12, at 297. 
61  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra notes 14, 17 (discussing the con-
tours and practice of appellate court discretion under these rules). 
62  For an example of the costs of discretionary gatekeeping by appellate courts, see Sumitomo Cop-
per Litigation v. Credit Lyonnais Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001), which conducts a detailed 
review of a class certification decision only to find that it did not present issues pressing enough to war-
rant discretionary review. 
63  Carrington, supra note 13, at 170. 
64  Party agreement does inform some applications for interlocutory review today.  District courts 
may be more likely to certify questions when the parties agree that they meet the test in § 1292(b).  It is 
also “not uncommon for the parties to file a joint or stipulated motion seeking a Rule 54(b) judgment” 
that triggers immediate review.  10 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, § 54.23[1][a].  In addition, district 
courts may work to facilitate review by manufacturing finality, as the appellate court recognized in Ny-
strom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003), when the parties agree that such review would ad-
vance the resolution of the case.  See infra note 72.  In the bankruptcy context, appeals from the 
bankruptcy judge to the court of appeals are authorized either upon certification by the bankruptcy judge 
or by “all the appellants and appellees (if any) acting jointly.”  28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  The certifica-
tion in question must specify one of three justifications for direct appellate review: the absence of con-
trolling law, a division of authority, or the prospect of “materially advanc[ing] the progress of the case.”  
Id. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).  In addition, the statute provides for the appellate court to exercise its discre-
tion in deciding whether to accept the appeal.  Id. § 158(d)(2)(A).  The law has less to do with authoriz-
ing the parties to agree to an interlocutory appeal than it does with allowing the parties to agree that a 
particular question ought to be the subject of direct review by the federal appellate court (rather than of 
two levels of review, beginning with the bankruptcy appellate panel).  According to published reports, 
the appellate courts have agreed to hear sixty-two such certified appeals and have declined on nineteen 
occasions.  See Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 
84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145, 164–69 & n.132 (2010).  In four cases, the certification leading to direct appel-
late review resulted from agreement of all the parties.  Id. at 170–71.  Finally, some settlement agree-
ments contemplate appellate review and thus reflect the parties’ agreement that such review will help 
resolve the case.  See infra Part I.C.3. 
65  See Glynn, supra note 12 at 246, 259. 
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only that the courts of appeals be required to hear those appeals that both 
parties support and that the district court certifies as appropriate for imme-
diate review.  By combining the notions that appellate review can make liti-
gation more cost-effective and that parties are well positioned to assess 
when there are benefits to be derived from appellate review, our proposal 
reframes the way appellate review ought to be considered by the courts. 
Though new within the field of appellate review, our suggested re-
liance on the parties to select orders for interlocutory review fits comforta-
bly with two bodies of literature.  One body of literature explores the 
factors that influence the way parties select cases for trial and settle cases in 
the shadow of the law.  Drawing on this literature, we think the parties’ 
self-interest would lead them to identify orders with a substantial probabili-
ty of appellate reversal.  The classic article by Professors George Priest and 
Benjamin Klein shows that the parties will tend to select cases for trial in 
which they perceive genuine uncertainty as to the outcome.66  Weak cases 
will be weeded out and strong cases may settle without any need for litiga-
tion.67  The same logic would, we believe, lead the parties to select cases for 
interlocutory appellate review in which the prospects for appellate reversal 
are significant.  In other words, a model of party autonomy will identify 
precisely those orders that pose a significant threat of appellate reversal and 
will most likely block resolution through settlement.   
A second body of literature recognizes and explores the implications of 
the parties’ power to choose a forum for the resolution of their disputes.68  
Courts freely enforce forum selection clauses, whether they call for the res-
olution of the dispute by the publicly funded court system or by a privately 
 
66  George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (1984); see also Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 213 
(2007) (“Uncertainty begets the lawsuit.”).  But see Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: 
A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 333 
(1991) (empirically testing Priest and Klein’s selection hypothesis and finding that the hypothesis is in-
consistent with the collected data). 
67  See Priest & Klein, supra note 66, at 19 (asserting that, as parties’ likelihood of being wrong 
about the outcome of litigation decreases, their likelihood of reaching a settlement increases). 
68  See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
233 (2008); Okuma Kazutake, Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Consolidation 
of Multiparty and Classwide Arbitration, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 189 (2003); Michael L. Mof-
fitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
461 (2007); Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 
25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forum-selection clauses is a manifestation of the in-
creasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional and related matters.”).  In addition to forum selec-
tion and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), parties also have the option of consenting to a jury or 
bench trial conducted by a magistrate judge.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).  The importance of litigant au-
tonomy grows out of the general individual autonomy valued in democratic society.  See Martin H. Re-
dish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due 
Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2007) (“[L]itigant autonomy should be acknowledged as a logi-
cal outgrowth of the nation’s commitment to process-based liberal democratic thought, and therefore a 
foundational element of procedural due process analysis.”). 
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paid arbitral panel.69  Parties can exercise their choice of forum at any stage 
in the process, opting out of the civil justice system either before or after the 
dispute arises.70  Indeed, recent developments suggest that the parties can 
ask a private arbitration panel to conduct the functional equivalent of appel-
late review of a judicial decision.71  The growing familiarity with party au-
tonomy in the choice of forum suggests that its use to select cases for inter-
interlocutory review would not prove unduly disruptive or controversial. 
We present our argument for a party-based approach to interlocutory 
review in two parts.  Part I begins with the intuitive case for party-based re-
view, offering a simple hypothetical case to explain why the parties might 
agree on the need for appellate intervention.  We next formalize the model 
of party-based review, drawing on the literature that has developed around 
the selection of cases for trial.  We find that the model predicts that the par-
ties will agree to interlocutory review in cases where both parties anticipate 
relatively high costs associated with taking the case to trial, relatively low 
costs of appellate intervention, and a relatively substantial likelihood of ap-
pellate reversal.  Appellate review of such orders makes sense to the parties 
because the prospect of post-verdict or final judgment review threatens to 
upset everything that has gone before.  Party-based review makes systemic 
sense because it applies to one identifiable set of orders likely to produce 
net efficiencies for the system of litigation as a whole.  Finally, we offer 
evidence to support our claim that modern litigation will often produce situ-
ations in which the parties (and the system) can profit from agreed-upon 
appellate review. 
Part II of the Article considers a variety of objections to our proposal.  
We first consider objections based upon the policies underlying the final 
judgment rule.  We show that our proposal does not run afoul of the sensi-
 
69  See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding a forum selection 
clause in fine print on the back of a cruise ticket); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (giving effect to an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the fact that it 
would result in piecemeal litigation); see also Solimine, supra note 12, at 1210–11 (discussing arbitra-
tion in the context of the collateral order doctrine).  For a discussion of how party autonomy influences 
arbitration, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy 
in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1201 (2000): “[C]ourts have largely accepted the party 
autonomy model, willingly adapting their own processes to meet the articulated needs of the litigants.” 
70  Cf. Redish & Larsen, supra note 68, at 1574 (“[T]he theoretical foundation of the procedural due 
process guarantee [is] the individual litigant’s autonomy in deciding whether to pursue her claim and if 
so, how best to conduct that litigation.”). 
71  See Controlling Legal Costs—Law Firms: Consider Appellate Arbitration and Consultation, 
METRO. CORP. COUNS., Feb. 1, 2010, at 12; see also Moffitt, supra note 68, at 475 (proposing customi-
zation of the appellate experience).  Although Professor Moffitt argues for allowing litigants to agree to 
customize the appellate process, the customization he envisions is more related to curtailing rather than 
expanding appellate review.  See id. at 477–78.  The courts of appeals also provide mediation programs 
that provide assistance to parties in settling as an alternative to appellate litigation.  See Gilbert J. Gins-
burg, The Case for a Mediation Program in the Federal Circuit, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1379, 1382–89 
(2001) (surveying various ADR programs of the courts of appeals). 
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ble policies of avoiding unnecessary, fragmented, or repetitive review.  We 
next consider an objection based on the limits that the case-or-controversy 
requirements of Article III impose on the power of appellate courts to hear 
feigned or contrived cases and to issue advisory opinions.  We show that, 
with the exception of appellate review aimed at purchasing a favorable 
precedent, party-based review does not present an Article III problem.  Par-
ties to a genuine dispute can agree between themselves on the need for a de-
termination of their respective rights and obligations without depriving the 
court of its power to issue a declaratory judgment; party agreement on the 
need for judicial resolution does not mean that the dispute lacks the ge-
nuineness needed to support the exercise of federal judicial power.  Finally, 
we address what we call the “incidence problem”: the concern that the pro-
posal will produce either too much or too little interlocutory review.  For a 
variety of reasons, we do not believe our proposal will give rise to un-
bridled interlocutory review.  While it is possible that plaintiffs will prefer 
to take their cases to trial in the face of a threat of appellate reversal, we ex-
plain why we doubt that plaintiffs will act irrationally and how the parties 
can structure side deals that facilitate appellate review.   
I. THE CASE FOR PARTY-BASED INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW 
In this Part, we set forth our case for a rule that would allow the parties 
to agree to interlocutory appellate review.  We begin with the most 
straightforward claim: when one takes account of the prospects for settle-
ment and the costs associated with litigation at the district court level, the 
parties will often have a common financial interest in agreeing to the inter-
locutory review of controlling questions of law.  Early resolution of such 
controlling questions can obviate the necessity for a trial, provide important 
information to shape the way the case proceeds to trial, and eliminate the 
possibility of a post-trial appellate invalidation of the judgment.  One can 
generalize by saying that review makes sense when the parties expect to 
gain more from legal clarification (and from avoiding the costs associated 
with a flawed or unnecessary trial) than they expect to expend in obtaining 
an appellate resolution.  What’s more, the parties’ financial incentives will 
lead them to agree to interlocutory review in precisely those closely divided 
cases of legal uncertainty in which the systemic interest in the low-cost res-
olution of disputes will favor interlocutory review.  By allowing the parties 
to identify cost-effective interlocutory review, our proposal should improve 
the overall operation of the dispute resolution system. 
We develop three separate arguments in favor of a party-driven ap-
proach to interlocutory review.  In the first section of this Part, we offer a 
simple hypothetical to illustrate the intuitive case for party autonomy.  We 
then attempt in the second section to formalize the intuitive case, drawing 
on the theoretical literature that has developed around the economics of set-
tlement negotiations.  After setting forth the intuitive and theoretical cases 
for party autonomy, the third section develops empirical support for the 
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proposal.  For starters, we explore a number of cases in which it appears 
that something like party-based appellate review may already be occurring 
in the federal courts.  Indeed, in the field of patent litigation and elsewhere, 
federal courts have responded to the demand for interlocutory review by 
acting to facilitate review through manufactured finality doctrines that can 
be quite difficult to square with current law.72  In addition, we show that the 
federal courts have transformed issues of fact into questions of law that re-
quire judicial resolution.  This trend toward shifting issues from jury to 
judge—or what we call judicialization—creates a growing demand for in-
terlocutory review as parties seek the resolution of decisive questions by the 
appellate court.  Finally, we show that many fields of complex litigation 
display the financial characteristics (expensive trial costs relative to the 
costs of appellate review) that would tend to make party-based interlocutory 
review viable. 
A. The Intuitive Case for Party Autonomy 
To see the intuition behind our proposal, consider a garden-variety mo-
tion to dismiss an action on statute of limitations grounds.73  Under current 
law, the district court’s rejection of such a threshold motion would consti-
tute a nonfinal order and would not be subject to immediate appellate re-
 
72  Manufactured finality involves the voluntary dismissal of “peripheral” claims in the district court 
following pretrial resolution of the “central or core” claim, thus rendering the core claim order “disposi-
tive, final, and appealable.”  Rebecca A. Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by “Manufacturing” a Fi-
nal Judgment Through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 MERCER L. REV. 979, 982 (1997).  
Though apparently straightforward, the manufactured finality doctrine has divided the circuits over the 
use of a without-prejudice dismissal of the peripheral claims.  See Doe v. United States, 513 F.3d 1348, 
1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the split among circuits).  At the suggestion of Mark Levy, the 
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States has taken up the 
manufactured finality issue.  See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, AGENDA FOR SPRING 2009 
MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 19–20 (1999), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda Books/Appellate/AP2009-04.pdf; Mark I. Levy, 
Manufactured Finality, NAT’L L.J., May 5, 2008, at 13. 
Professor Pierre Bergeron, on the other hand, notes circuit agreement regarding finality of without-
prejudice dismissals after compelled arbitration.  See Bergeron, supra note 45, at 1382–83 & n.111.  
This is because a with-prejudice dismissal might have the effect of preventing the parties from re-
entering court to secure and enforce a judgment on the arbitration award.  See Interactive Flight Techs., 
Inc. v. Swissair Swiss Air Transp. Co., 249 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the lower 
court’s without-prejudice dismissal was only without prejudice in the sense that it was not meant to 
preclude parties from bringing a new action to enter judgment after completing arbitration).  Professor 
Bergeron’s proposal regarding orders compelling arbitration can, in fact, be seen as an implementation 
of the manufactured finality doctrine through without-prejudice dismissal.  See Bergeron, supra note 45, 
at 1392–94 (proposing that a district court dismiss litigation simultaneously with ordering arbitration if it 
feels that immediate review is important). 
73  The validity of a statute of limitations defense may turn on a preliminary question of law.  See 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007) (rejecting the argument that 
each paycheck was a fresh violation of equal employment laws for statute of limitations purposes); 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 743 (1980) (concluding that state tolling rules determine 
the timeliness of a claim governed by state law). 
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view.74  Such an application of the final judgment rule makes sense in most 
situations.  Defendants almost always prefer interlocutory review; a suc-
cessful appeal might secure the action’s dismissal and will often, in the 
meantime, delay the discovery and trial phases of the litigation.75  The de-
fendants’ predictable desire for delay means that allowing routine or cate-
gorical review of such orders does not make sense; defendants could seek 
review even in cases in which the only goal was to delay and there was only 
the slightest prospect of appellate reversal.  But despite the general rule, in-
terlocutory review may be appropriate in cases in which the defendant has a 
substantial prospect of success on appeal.  Interlocutory review could sus-
tain the limitations defense, thus obviating the need for further proceedings 
at the trial level.  Even if the appellate court were to affirm the rejection of 
the defense and remand for trial, the decision might clear the way for a set-
tlement that would have been difficult to reach so long as the limitations de-
fense remained unresolved.  Especially when appellate review costs less 
than the trials avoided or decisively reshaped thereby (an assumption that 
often holds),76 review of substantial defenses could make the system more 
efficient. 
The trick lies in identifying the cases in which the defendant has a suf-
ficiently substantial claim to warrant interlocutory review given the ex-
pected costs of trial and appellate review.  It may not seem obvious at first 
blush why plaintiffs would ever agree to such review, having overcome a 
 
74  See Parmar v. Jeetish Imps., Inc., 180 F.3d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “the denial of a 
statute-of-limitations defense may effectively be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment” and 
awarding sanctions based on defendant’s attempt to receive immediate review of its motion to dismiss 
based on the statute of limitations); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
873, 876 (1994) (suggesting that a limitations defense should not be regarded as a collateral order that 
would warrant interlocutory review); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 551 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that denial of a motion to dismiss on statute of 
limitations grounds would only be immediately reviewable if such a defense conferred the right not to be 
sued). 
75  See Solimine, supra note 12, at 1168 (noting that the final judgment rule “discourages the delay 
of trial proceedings and harassment of party opponents”). 
76  The American Intellectual Property Law Association reports that, for patent litigation suits with 
$1,000,000 to $25,000,000 at risk, the median cost of litigation is $1,500,000 through the end of discov-
ery and $2,500,000 inclusive of everything, including trials and appeals.  AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMY SURVEY 2009, at 29 (2009).  Pretrial litigation costs, including 
discovery, are therefore the majority of the costs in patent litigation suits.  Even if the $1,000,000 post-
discovery expense is divided equally between trial and appeal, an appeal would still only represent 20% 
of the total cost of litigation.  See SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL 
CASES 48–49 (1999) (discussing the cost–benefit model for determining whether to appeal and the role 
of transaction costs—including “nominal” appellate court fees and somewhat higher lawyer’s fees—in 
making that determination); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 243 (2008) (noting that the low 
cost of appeal and the high overall stakes in patent cases mean that most cases are appealed).  See gen-
erally Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Explora-
tion of Anti-plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 660 (2004) (finding that 
judgments resulting from trial are appealed at twice the rate of nontrial judgments). 
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motion to dismiss at the district court level.  But return to our hypothetical 
case and consider a situation in which the plaintiff predicts that the trial, 
though expensive, will result in a substantial plaintiff’s verdict that the de-
fendant can attack, perhaps successfully, with the limitations defense.  If the 
plaintiff views the limitations defense as substantial, the plaintiff might pre-
fer to litigate that issue right away, before incurring the expense necessary 
to prepare the case for trial.  After all, the plaintiff can predict that the de-
fendant will renew the limitations defense on appeal from any verdict.  If 
the plaintiff succeeds in clarifying in advance of trial that the limitations de-
fense was properly rejected, the plaintiff will have removed an important 
legal barrier to liability.  Plaintiffs thus have an incentive to agree to inter-
locutory review in precisely those cases in which the threat of appellate re-
versal looms relatively large and the costs of seeking interlocutory review 
seem low in comparison to the cost of trial.  Indeed, in many cases like the 
one involving the hypothetical limitations defense, the parties may agree to 
settle the case after the appellate court rules.  Interlocutory review will thus 
facilitate settlement in the shadow of a (newly clarified) law and avoid the 
cost of trial even in cases where the appellate court affirms the district 
court’s rejection of the defense and remands for further proceedings. 
B. The Formal Case for Party Autonomy 
One can create a simple model to formalize the intuition underlying the 
exemplary case just described.  Suppose a personal injury claimant has a 
solid case on liability; both the plaintiff and defendant predict that in 90% 
of cases with similar facts, the jury will return a plaintiff’s verdict.  Suppose 
further that both sides reckon the likely jury verdict at a value of $100.  Fi-
nally, suppose that both sides will face trial costs of $10 to take the case to 
the jury.  In such a simplified world, we can sketch the likely settlement 
range.  The plaintiff should accept any amount above $80, representing the 
expected value of the verdict less the cost of taking the case to trial (costs 
that the plaintiff will avoid by settling before trial) [(0.9 × 100) – 10 = 80].  
The defendant should be willing to pay any amount less than $100, 
representing the expected value of the verdict plus the defendant’s expected 
cost of taking the case to trial [(0.9 × 100) + 10 = 100].  Such a case should 
settle between $80 and $100, a range scholars sometimes describe as the 
zone of potential agreement (ZOPA).77 
 
77  See Donald R. Philbin, Jr., The One Minute Manager Prepares for Mediation: A Multidiscipli-
nary Approach to Negotiation Preparation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 249, 273 (2008) (discussing how 
valuation affects the ZOPA).  Two general theoretical frameworks help analyze the interaction of factors 
bearing on settlement.  See Gross & Syverud, supra note 66, at 321.  The first, sometimes referred to as 
the “expectations framework,” posits that parties have independent expectations of the likelihood of suc-
cess of a suit and the damages at issue.  See George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: 
Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 219 (1985); Priest & Klein, supra note 66, 
at 9.  Under this framework, settlement occurs if the expected judgments of each party are close enough 
to allow settlement.  The theory assumes that the parties evaluate the cost of trial differently in determin-
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The introduction of divergent views on a judicial question, such as the 
admissibility of an expert’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,78 can complicate the settlement calculus.  Suppose 
that in the above case the claimant and defendant have different views of 
the viability of the claim.  The plaintiff believes he has a 90% chance of a 
verdict in his favor, while the defendant believes there is only a 60% chance 
of a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.  These divergent views reflect the par-
ties’ evaluations of the plaintiff’s medical expert.  While the plaintiff be-
lieves the expert will sway the jury, the defendant does not believe the 
testimony meets the minimum threshold of reliability needed for admission 
of expert testimony.79  Unlike the situation where parties agree on the via-
bility of a claim, the parties will no longer be able to settle.  The plaintiff 
should still accept any amount above $80, since he still has the same belief 
in his success at trial.  The defendant, however, will be unwilling to pay 
more than $70 [(0.6 × 100) + 10 = 70].  Because the lowest amount the 
plaintiff will accept exceeds the highest amount the defendant will offer, the 
parties will have no ZOPA and cannot reach a settlement.80 
Imagine the litigation proceeds and the defendant moves to have the 
medical expert disqualified.  The judge, however, deals a blow to the de-
fendant by allowing the expert’s testimony.  The plaintiff and defendant 
both now agree that, if the ruling stands, the plaintiff has a 90% chance of 
succeeding at trial.  If there were no chance of appellate reversal of that de-
cision, the parties could now settle.81  Settlement, however, must still over-
come the parties’ differing views of the likelihood that the trial court’s 
ruling on the expert’s testimony will withstand appellate review.  Assume 
that the plaintiff assesses the likelihood of appellate affirmance at 80%, 
 
ing what would be an acceptable settlement.  The plaintiff’s minimum settlement demand subtracts the 
plaintiff’s litigation costs from the expected judgment.  The defendant’s maximum settlement offer, on 
the other hand, represents the expected judgment plus the litigation costs.  See Gross & Syverud, supra 
note 66, at 323–24.  The second approach to determining when settlement is likely to occur considers the 
strategic behavior of the parties during negotiation.  See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnoo-
kin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
225 (1982); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972–73 (1979).  In the strategic approach, the behavior of the parties dur-
ing negotiation can result in a failure to arrive at an agreement prior to trial, notwithstanding the fact that 
their expectations would produce a ZOPA. 
78  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
79  See infra notes 160–77 and accompanying text. 
80  This is a typical situation where the parties are mutually optimistic about their chances of success 
at trial and therefore cannot reach a settlement.  See JJ Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, Trial 
and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements 2 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 678, 2010), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/
678_Spier.php. 
81  In fact, motion practice in general appears to accelerate parties’ ability to settle.  See Christina L. 
Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement 19 (Temple Univ. Legal Studies Research, 
Paper No. 2011-8, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/=1649643. 
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whereas the defendant sees only a 50% chance the higher court will uphold 
the ruling.  To calculate the settlement prospects at this point, we consider 
both the likelihood of a favorable jury verdict as well as the likelihood of an 
order upholding that verdict on appeal.  In addition, both sides must take 
account of the costs of appeal (which we will assume to be $2).  The least 
the plaintiff should be willing to accept is now $60, which is the expected 
value of the verdict [0.9 × 100 = 90] multiplied by the plaintiff’s belief that 
there is an 80% chance the verdict will stand after appeal, less the expected 
trial costs and appeal costs [(0.8 × 90) – 10 – 2 = 60].82  On the other hand, 
while the defendant evaluates the jury’s verdict at $90, the defendant will 
offer no more than $57 [(0.5 × 90) + 10 + 2 = 57].  Again, no settlement is 
possible. 
Assume that the case proceeds to trial and that the court allows the 
medical expert to testify.  Assume further that (as both sides predicted) the 
jury finds the defendant liable and awards damages of $100.  Even now, af-
ter a jury verdict, the parties will be unable to forgo the appeal and settle.83  
The differing assessments of the likelihood of appellate court reversal con-
tinue to prevent settlement.  The plaintiff’s settlement floor will now be 
$78, the value of the jury’s verdict multiplied by the plaintiff’s 80% expec-
tation it will be upheld, less the costs of appeal [(0.8 × 100) – 2 = 78].84  The 
defendant’s settlement ceiling will now be $52, based on the defendant’s 
 
82  To keep the model simple, we have assumed that a reversal of the ruling would necessitate the 
reversal of any verdict for the plaintiff and would not occasion a new trial.  If we take account of the 
possibility of a second trial based on an appellate decision, we can see how interlocutory review may 
encourage settlement and, therefore, why parties might consent to immediate review in certain situa-
tions.  As a party’s expectation of a remand by the appellate court for a new trial goes up, so do her ex-
pected litigation costs because she expects to pay for two trials instead of one.  Taking this into account 
could significantly enlarge an existing ZOPA (or create a ZOPA where one had not existed previously) 
because it reduces the minimum amount a plaintiff would accept and, at the same time, raises the 
amount the defendant would offer.  Interlocutory review would be especially helpful as the reversal and 
remand rate approaches 50%.  As with expectations about close cases generally, expectations about the 
outcome of appeal in cases of imperfect foresight are more likely to be error prone.  See Priest & Klein, 
supra note 66, at 14–15.  Interlocutory review in this situation would significantly lower the likelihood 
of a new trial by removing concerns about reversal on the issue at hand. 
83  In general, analyses under the Priest and Klein framework do not separate out trial from appeal 
except to note that a case that is close enough to go to trial will also likely be close enough to be ap-
pealed.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 66, at 51–52; see also Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoff-
rey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection 
of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 249–50 & tbl.3 (1996) (conducting an empirical analy-
sis of the selection hypothesis in federal appellate cases).  Priest and Klein also note that, if the trial 
judge’s views of the law are clearly at odds with those of the appellate court, the parties will “‘reverse’ 
the trial judge privately” by taking that into account in deriving their expectations of a successful appeal 
and deciding whether and on what terms to settle at that time.  Priest & Klein, supra note 66, at 52; see 
also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 119 (1996) (noting that the 
observed increase in appeal rates may result from growing legal uncertainty, making it more difficult for 
parties to “converge on the likely outcome of an appeal”). 
84  The costs of trial are now sunk costs and are therefore not considered.  In addition, the jury’s ac-
tual judgment replaces both sides’ expected judgments. 
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view that the appellate court will reverse in 50% of such cases [(0.5 × 100) 
+ 2 = 52]. 
Now consider the settlement possibilities if, at the point where the dis-
trict court allowed the medical expert’s testimony, interlocutory review 
were available.  The interlocutory review would have the effect of reducing 
the uncertainty inherent in the question of law, and the parties’ predictions 
of success would converge.  If the appellate court rules in the plaintiff’s fa-
vor, upholding the trial court’s decision, both sides will now agree that 
there is a 90% chance of success at trial.  This resembles the simple initial 
case, where both parties believed the expected judgment was $90 [0.9 × 100 
= 90] and there was a ZOPA between $80 and $100.  If the appellate court 
rules in the defendant’s favor, overruling the trial court and rejecting the 
expert’s testimony, the plaintiff will likely reduce his estimate of success at 
trial to match the defendant’s initial belief that there is a 60% chance of 
success at trial.  In this case, both sides will agree that the expected judg-
ment is now $60 [0.6 × 100 = 60].  This will create a ZOPA between $50 
[(0.6 × 100) – 10 = 50] and $70 [(0.6 × 100) + 10 = 70].  Knowing that se-
curing a resolution from the appellate court in either direction could open 
up a settlement window, the parties might agree to interlocutory review.85  
In fact, the availability of interlocutory review by consent might encourage 
the parties to settle before the appeal for somewhere in the lower settlement 
range, with an additional $20 to be paid to the plaintiff if the appellate court 
upholds the trial court’s ruling.86 
Yet interlocutory review does not make sense in every case.  If the par-
ties’ views of the likelihood of success at trial are very different, regardless 
of the outcome of the appeal, interlocutory appeal may not create a ZOPA.  
We can illustrate that idea by modifying our example such that the allow-
ance of the expert’s testimony has little impact on the defendant’s view that 
there is only a 60% chance of success at trial.  Then even if the ruling is 
 
85  Even in the situation where the ZOPA makes settlement possible without interlocutory review, 
there may still be reason for parties to agree on immediate review.  See Rhee, supra note 66, at 229–39, 
254 (noting that “[c]ertainty obviates litigation [and] uncertainty begets dispute” and that parties may be 
willing to spend money to hedge against uncertainty).  Parties may consent to interlocutory review simp-
ly to better determine the risk of trial and to make sure they know that they are properly valuing settle-
ment.  Even if the parties’ initial estimates lead them to believe there is room for negotiation, each may 
still be willing to pay the relatively small cost of an appeal to remove the uncertainty and make sure he 
or she is not offering (or accepting) more (or less) than he or she should. 
The sequential nature of appellate decisionmaking has been noted as a barrier to settlement.  See 
POSNER, supra note 83, at 120.  Allowing parties to consent to interlocutory review could reverse the 
standard sequence—full judgment by the district court prior to appellate review of specific issues—and 
therefore remove, at least partially, that barrier.  Professor Steven Shavell has also proposed that allow-
ing litigants the option to shape their appellate experience—in his case by allowing the choice between 
direct appeal and discretionary review—can reduce uncertainty and therefore promote settlement.  Ste-
ven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review Versus 
Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 86–93 (2010). 
86  For additional discussion of contingent appellate settlement agreements, see infra note 206. 
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upheld, the most the defendant would offer is $70 [(0.6 × 100) + 10 = 70], 
while the plaintiff would still not settle for less than $80 [(0.9 × 100) – 10 = 
80].  The example illustrates the intuitive notion that, where the parties’ as-
sessments of the strength of the defense vary widely, they are unlikely to 
reach an agreement.  For the same reason, the parties have little incentive to 
agree on interlocutory appellate review of the issue: the plaintiff would tend 
to regard the defendant’s proposal for early review as aimed at obfuscation 
and delay. 
This simple model predicts that the parties’ ability to secure interlocu-
tory review to gain clarification of a legal question important to the litiga-
tion before incurring the cost of preparing the case for trial will yield 
settlement prospects that are otherwise unavailable.  Interlocutory review 
may be especially attractive in cases in which the parties predict a relatively 
expensive trial that might be negated or decisively reshaped by appellate 
review.  When the costs of appeal are relatively low in relation to the costs 
of trial, and appellate resolution of a legal question can shape (or reshape) 
the trial, the parties will have incentives to secure the appellate court’s view 
before they present the case to the jury.  In the next section, we contend that 
this basic intuition applies broadly in light of the continuing growth of deci-
sive legal questions.  We show that the assertion of greater judicial control 
over the resolution of civil disputes has created a corresponding increase in 
the demand for interlocutory oversight. 
C. The Empirical Case for Party Autonomy 
Moving from the intuitive and theoretical worlds to the somewhat mes-
sier world of the litigated case, we find evidence that the parties agree to 
seek early answers to decisive legal questions and that courts sometimes 
struggle to provide them.  We focus on three situations that illustrate the 
ways in which the parties and the district courts work to procure legal clari-
fication from the appellate courts and the somewhat inconsistent reception 
such efforts have encountered from the appellate bench. 
1. Patent Litigation and Markman Hearings.—Patent litigation dis-
plays many of the characteristics that produce joint requests for early appel-
late intervention.  Patent cases often feature substantial claims for damages, 
expensive trials, and relatively inexpensive appellate review.87  Patent litiga-
tion also produces controlling questions of fact and law, such as the judicial 
construction of patent claims, that can play a central role in resolving suits 
for patent infringement and patent invalidity.88  At one time, issues of patent 
 
87  See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 243. 
88  A patent’s claims “define the invention which an applicant believes is patentable.”  In re Van 
Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Claim construction is the process of interpreting and ela-
borating on the normally terse claim language in order to explain the scope of the claims.  Scripps Clinic 
& Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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claim construction were simply sent to the jury along with the litigants’ as-
sertions of infringement and invalidity.89  The jury sorted out the scope of 
the patent’s claims in the course of resolving the dispute, and appellate re-
view followed in due course.90  All that changed in 1996 with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., which held that 
construction issues should be treated as matters of law for the court (rather 
than as issues of fact for the jury) to resolve.91  Now district courts routinely 
conduct Markman hearings at which the parties litigate claim construction 
issues in formats that “run the gamut from mid-trial sidebar conferences 
that undergird relevance rulings . . . to virtual mini-trials extending over 
several days and generating extensive evidentiary records.”92  The result of 
such hearings can effectively determine the settlement value of the in-
fringement suit.93 
The patent infringement case Nystrom v. TREX Co.94 illustrates how 
the recognition of a judicial role in claim construction can shape the parties’ 
demand for appellate oversight.  The district court conducted a Markman 
hearing and rendered a decision on the scope of the patent that was, as a 
practical matter, fatal to the plaintiff’s theory of infringement.95  Yet the de-
cision did not satisfy the requirements for appellate review under the final 
judgment rule.96  The court did not formally reject plaintiff’s infringement 
claim and did not resolve the defendant’s counterclaim of patent invalidi-
ty.97  Lacking a final judgment, “which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”98 the parties 
 
89  See, e.g., Brian Michael Martin, Federal Circuit Limits Jury’s Role in Patent Trials, 77 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 641 (1995). 
90  See, e.g., id. 
91  517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (construing the patent claims as presenting a mixed question of law and 
fact for the court to resolve). 
92  MediaCom Corp. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 17, 21 (D. Mass. 1998).  See also Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (describing the relative value of intrin-
sic and extrinsic evidence in claim construction). 
93  See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 33.22 (2004) (“[M]any patent cases are re-
solved once the claim construction is decided, either through summary judgment or settlement . . . .”).  
To determine if a patent has been infringed, the tribunal must decide how broadly to construe the claims 
in the patent.  A patent’s claims act as the “metes and bounds” of the monopoly grant.  Kimberly A. 
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 
(2001) (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and KCJ Corp. v. 
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
94  Nystrom v. TREX Co. (Nystrom I), 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
95  See id. at 1348–49. 
96  Id. at 1349. 
97  Id. 
98  Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
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(and the district court) sought a mechanism with which to secure interlocu-
tory review.99 
After requesting suggestions from the parties about how to proceed, the 
district court attempted to finalize its judgment by granting a partial sum-
mary judgment as to certain of the infringement claims and entering a stay 
pending appeal of the remaining allegations.100  The apparent goal of the 
district court’s stay order was to accept the parties’ request to put every-
thing else on hold and trigger review of the Markman decision.101  The Fed-
eral Circuit, however, refused to accept this mode of facilitating review.102  
The stay order did not resolve the case on the merits, the Federal Circuit 
correctly observed, and thus did not operate as a final judgment.103  After 
all, the district court could simply lift the stay when the case was decided at 
the appellate level and the counterclaims would return to active litigation.  
Stays are generally not final,104 and dispositions that fail to resolve pending 
counterclaims also fail the final judgment rule.105  To accept this mode of 
 
99  Apparently at the parties’ behest, the district court attempted to ripen the claim construction order 
for appellate review by staying the other claims in litigation.  See Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1349.  The liti-
gation began with an action alleging that TREX had infringed Nystrom’s patent on a particular kind of 
curved exterior wood flooring.  Nystrom v. TREX Co. (Nystrom III), 580 F.3d 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  The curving of the flooring was slight enough that it was still comfortable to walk on but sub-
stantial enough to allow water to drain and for the boards to be easily stacked.  Id.  TREX countered 
with allegations of patent invalidity and noninfringement.  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1348. 
100  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1349.  Although the district court had entered a partial summary judg-
ment, it did not certify the finality of that judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).  
Id. at 1351. 
101  See id. at 1349–50 (noting that the parties’ suggestions to the district court were “three possible 
avenues of appeal as a matter of right”). 
102  See id. at 1350. 
103  Id. at 1351. 
104  But see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996) (concluding that a stay order 
based on abstention doctrine was appealable as a final decision because it effectively put the litigants out 
of court); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (concluding 
that a stay order was appealable as a final decision because the only issue in the federal forum was one 
that would be resolved in state court, therefore ending litigation in the federal forum). 
105  Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter a judgment as to certain separable claims and ripen 
the case for appeal upon a finding that there is no just cause for delay.  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).  But to the 
extent that counterclaims present issues factually connected to the claims on which judgment was en-
tered, the connection may defeat Rule 54’s separable claims requirement and foreclose the assertion of 
appellate jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 826–29 (10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing a 
district court order to ensure that the adjudicated claims and unadjudicated counterclaims were truly 
separate for purposes of Rule 54).  To the extent that counterclaims have been dismissed without preju-
dice and remain subject to revival, their presence in the litigation defeats the final judgment rule.  See, 
e.g., India Breweries, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 612 F.3d 651, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the 
general rule that without-prejudice dismissals of counterclaims do not ripen a case for appellate review 
but concluding that a last-second, with-prejudice dismissal of the counterclaim in question sufficed to 
create finality). 
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review, the Federal Circuit noted, would represent a departure from settled 
precedent and the ban on piecemeal litigation.106 
The Nystrom parties’ desire for appellate review was no doubt shar-
pened by the Federal Circuit’s practice of closely evaluating claim construc-
tion decisions.  Empirical studies of the Federal Circuit suggest that the 
reversal rate on claim construction questions approaches 40%.107  This com-
pares with an appellate reversal rate in all civil proceedings in the federal 
system that hovers around 20%.108  Such a reversal rate could influence the 
parties’ willingness to settle on the basis of a trial court’s claim construction 
decision.  If we assume that a party in the position of Nystrom has an in-
fringement claim worth $10 million,109 a 40% chance of overturning the dis-
trict court’s claim construction decision, and the prospect of substantial trial 
expenses, the incentives to seek immediate review seem obvious.  Even the 
defendant, TREX, might prefer immediate appellate review, knowing that 
the case cannot settle as long as Nystrom views itself as owning a patent in-
fringement claim that it values at $4 million.110  For TREX, an appellate re-
jection of the plaintiff’s claim construction may provide a cheaper way to 
end the litigation than trial on the issues remaining after the district court’s 
disposition. 
Despite the parties’ shared desire for immediate review of the Mark-
man ruling, existing law provides few good options.  One can hardly cha-
racterize the claim construction question as sufficiently divorced from the 
merits to bring the collateral order doctrine into play.  Nor can one find the 
elements of a denial of injunctive relief in the decision (even though plain-
tiffs will occasionally include requests for injunctive relief in their in-
 
106  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d at 1350. 
107  See Schwartz, supra note 76, at 240 tbl.1 (finding that 38.8% of cases adjudicated by the Federal 
Circuit contain at least one wrongly construed term); see also Moore, supra note 93, at 11–12 & fig.1 
(“[A]ccording to the Federal Circuit, the district court claim constructions were wrong 28% of the 
time.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245–47 (2005) (noting that the reversal rate of claim construction is get-
ting higher). 
108  See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 
150 (2002) (finding an 80% affirmance rate).  While accounts differ as to why the Federal Circuit so 
frequently reverses on claim construction matters, we note that claim construction rulings, including 
resolutions of related factual questions, are reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit.  Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
109  Damages for patent infringement are those “adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty.”  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  The floor of “reasonable royalty” 
damages means that the plaintiff may be able to recover a large damages award even if he or she does 
not practice the invention to the same extent as the defendant (or at all).  Although Nystrom was a work-
ing carpenter, Nystrom III, 580 F.3d 1281, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and likely did not intend to manufac-
ture wood flooring on a large scale, if TREX was found to have infringed, Nystrom’s damages would 
have been calculated as a royalty on TREX’s production, as it would likely be more than Nystrom’s ac-
tual damages.  The court can increase such damages “up to three times” for willful infringement.  35 
U.S.C. § 284. 
110  See supra Part I.B. 
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fringement complaint and even though an adverse claim construction deci-
sion necessarily reduces the practical prospects for securing such relief).  
Mandamus does not seem appropriate as a way to review the merits of the 
claim construction order,111 nor does it seem possible to characterize the de-
cision as a partial summary judgment of the kind that would bring into play 
the district court’s power under Rule 54(b) to declare such a judgment final 
for purposes of permitting execution and appellate review.112  Perhaps the 
most promising approach would be for the district court to certify, under 
§ 1292(b), that the decision involves a controlling question of law as to 
which there may be grounds for disagreement and as to which appellate re-
view will speed the ultimate resolution of the dispute.113  In some ways, this 
seems especially appropriate: claim construction requires the district court 
to answer an unsettled question of law (as the claims at issue have not been 
previously construed), and its resolution will clearly move the litigation 
forward significantly.  The Federal Circuit, however, has discretion to allow 
or reject such appeals and takes the view that “[s]uch appeals are rarely 
granted.”114 
Notwithstanding its lecture on the first principles of finality, the Feder-
al Circuit’s Nystrom opinion confirms the viability of an alternative mode 
of procuring interlocutory review that appears functionally identical to the 
district court’s approach.  In the course of describing how the district court 
could have taken steps to facilitate appellate review, the Nystrom court 
mentioned dismissal of the invalidity counterclaims.115  But the surprising 
feature of the opinion was its apparent suggestion that even a dismissal of 
the counterclaims without prejudice would suffice to create the sort of final-
ity needed to support appellate review.116  Such an approach would dispose 
of all pending matters and, at least in the view of the Federal Circuit, satisfy 
 
111  See Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (“[Mandamus] is a drastic and ex-
traordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.  The traditional use of the writ in aid of ap-
pellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the federal courts has been to confine [the court against 
which mandamus is sought] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction.” (second alteration in 
original) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
112  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); see also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) 
(noting that, absent another important reason for granting certification, a claim appealed under Rule 
54(b) should be separable from remaining claims in that the appellate court would not have to decide the 
same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals); Okla. Tpk. Auth. v. Bruner, 
259 F.3d 1236, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2001) (highlighting the importance of separability for Rule 54(b) cer-
tification). 
113  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) authorizes such review for the regional circuits, and § 1292(c)(1) authorizes 
review by the Federal Circuit of appeals authorized under § 1292(a)–(b) if the court would ordinarily 
have jurisdiction over the appeal.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(b)–(c)(1) (2006); see also supra note 14. 
114  Nystrom I, 339 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
115  See id. 
116  For a discussion of the circuit split regarding whether a without-prejudice dismissal provides the 
finality necessary for immediate review, see supra note 72. 
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the final judgment rule.117  Notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s approval 
of this approach to appellate review, one can fairly question whether the 
without-prejudice dismissal of the counterclaims differs in substance from 
the stay order that the court treated as nonfinal in Nystrom.  After all, the 
without-prejudice designation assumes that the dismissal does not operate 
as an adjudication on the merits to which preclusive effect will attach.118  
That means that the counterclaims of invalidity remain alive and subject to 
reactivation through the filing of claims or counterclaims.  As a practical 
matter, then, the without-prejudice dismissal operates in much the same 
way as the stay order.  The counterclaims go into hibernation pending the 
resolution of the appeal on claim construction but can return to active litiga-
tion depending on the outcome.  Indeed, the defendants would apparently 
be free to reassert their claims of invalidity even if the plaintiff failed to se-
cure the reversal of the adverse claim construction ruling.119 
Despite its curious features, we believe that the Federal Circuit’s Ny-
strom decision underscores the importance of party autonomy in determin-
ing when to make interlocutory review available.  In contrast to Nystrom’s 
emphasis on technical finality, we stress that the district court and the par-
ties apparently agreed that securing an appellate resolution of the claim 
construction issue before taking the case to trial would ultimately advance 
the resolution of the dispute.  The district court judge in the Nystrom saga 
was attempting to work with the parties to resolve a matter he considered 
important to the ongoing case, but the court of appeals refused to hear the 
appeal.  Our proposal would promote the district court judge’s authority by 
allowing him to certify the parties’ request for interlocutory review on a 
matter that would benefit from immediate appellate review.120 
2. Particularity to Facilitate Early Evaluation of Novel Claims.—
Litigation over novel theories of liability may also produce situations in 
 
117  Indeed, following dismissal of the appeal in Nystrom I, the parties returned to district court.  See 
Nystrom v. TREX Co. (Nystrom II), 424 F.3d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The court entered the sug-
gested order, dismissing the counterclaims without prejudice, and the case returned to the Federal Cir-
cuit for appellate review of the claim construction issue and the associated grant of summary judgment.  
See id.  The Federal Circuit in Nystrom II had no difficulty in concluding that the final judgment rule 
was satisfied by the dismissal of the counterclaims.  See id. 
118  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (distinguishing be-
tween adjudication on the merits, to which preclusive effect attaches, and without-prejudice dismissal).  
Regarding the meaning of “on the merits,” see Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 410–11 (2010), which notes two distinct meanings of “on the merits”: 
(1) “deciding cases accurately” and (2) “deciding cases under procedures that give the parties the full 
opportunity to present evidence and arguments.” 
119  See Erie Technological Prods., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. 179, 186–87 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that declaratory judgment relief for claims of invalidity can be granted at the 
discretion of the court). 
120  The idea that district court judges might view appellate courts as a resource to resolve important 
issues resembles Professor Cooper’s conception that trial judges might come to rely on appellate courts 
in a “mature[]” judicial system.  See supra note 27. 
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which the parties jointly prefer an early appellate resolution of a question of 
law.  One can see the logic of a joint desire for appellate review reflected in 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc.121  
There, the plaintiff suffered grievous personal injuries at the hands of armed 
robbers while he was waiting outside the defendant’s warehouse to unload 
his truck.122  Illinois law clearly imposed a duty on landowners to reasona-
bly guard against known threats posed by the unlawful conduct of third par-
ties.123  But Illinois law had not previously extended that duty to those who, 
like the plaintiff, were assaulted on a public street adjacent to a private 
warehouse.124  The case thus turned on whether the duty of the defendant 
extended to events taking place on public property over which the defen-
dant’s employees exercised a degree of control as part of their warehouse 
operation.125  As matters developed, the district court granted a motion to 
dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, and the Seventh Circuit 
upheld that decision on appeal.126  But why did the plaintiff choose to set 
forth the nature of the truck’s relationship to the warehouse in such detail, 
detail that virtually invited a motion to dismiss?127  The plaintiff might have 
survived a round of motion practice (at least in those pre-Iqbal days)128 by 
simply alleging that the truck was parked on premises that the defendant 
used as a warehouse.  Why did the plaintiff choose to plead in such detail? 
One answer to the puzzle of the detailed allegations may lie in the na-
ture of the legal issue that the case presented.  To be sure, the parties might 
dispute the factual question of what amount should be awarded as compen-
sation to the injured trucker.  But those sorts of disputes often yield to effec-
tive settlement negotiations, particularly after discovery has been conducted 
and depositions have been taken of treating physicians and other expert 
witnesses.  As long as the legal issue remained open, however, the case 
would predictably defy ready settlement.  If the district court and the defen-
dant were right, and Illinois law recognized no duty, the case had no value 
at all.129  If the plaintiff was right, by contrast, the verdict might well reach 
 
121  573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978). 
122  Id. at 431. 
123  Id. at 433 (citing Neering v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 50 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1943)). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 431, 437. 
126  Id. at 431–32, 438. 
127  See id. at 431 (noting that the complaint detailed “A & K’s practice, custom and habit over a pe-
riod of several years” of using the public thoroughfare as “an extension of the receiving dock area”). 
128  See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
129  In such a case, the parties might agree to appellate review of a district court order denying the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the order would be considered a nonfinal decree.  
Both parties have an incentive to economize on the costs of litigation.  Plaintiffs may not want to spend 
money to take a case to trial only to have the theory of liability overturned on appeal; it is better to know 
the legal viability of the action at an earlier stage.  Defendants, similarly, might well prefer to settle the 
case and avoid the costs of litigation once the federal courts determine that the claim has legal merit.  
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into the millions of dollars with breach of duty and resulting injury seeming 
perfectly straightforward.130  Initially, one might suppose that the plaintiff 
would prefer to plead generally with a hope of securing a nuisance settle-
ment (even if the legal claim were unavailing).  But the plaintiff might have 
also preferred to secure an early determination of the legal question, confi-
dent that the case would settle for a substantial sum if the court recognized 
the existence of a duty.  Such a desire for a legal determination could ex-
plain the detailed allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, allegations appar-
ently framed to set the stage for an evaluation of the legal issues.  The 
plaintiff (or his lawyers) may have sought to defer investment in the dis-
covery expenses needed to bring the case to trial until after the appellate 
court upheld the viability of the legal theory. 
We believe that a desire to secure an appellate court evaluation of the 
merits of a novel legal claim can help to explain a part of the otherwise 
puzzling tendency of plaintiffs, in the pre-Twombly–Iqbal world,131 to set 
forth their claims with greater particularity than the rules would have then 
required.  Many commentators have noted the confusing persistence of fact 
pleading in a setting where the rules required only that the complaint notify 
the defendant of the nature of the claim.132  Of course, Ashcroft v. Iqbal con-
firms that notice alone will no longer suffice: the plaintiff must plead 
enough nonconclusory factual information to satisfy a standard of plausibil-
ity.133  To the extent that the Mitchell plaintiff sought to hasten a definitive 
 
With their shared interest in avoiding litigation costs that might prove unnecessary whichever way the 
legal question comes out, both the parties and the federal system might well benefit from interlocutory 
review.  See supra Part I.B. 
130  Mitchell, 573 F.2d at 433 (noting that the defendant conceded that owners of land owe a duty to 
invitees to guard against criminal acts of third parties when the owner knows of previous incidents). 
131  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), confirms that the 
new pleading regime announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), applies gener-
ally to all claims brought in federal court.  Known by their telescoped name, Twiqbal, the two cases 
have spawned an enormous amount of scholarly commentary and nearly as much disputation in the low-
er federal courts.  For a modest sampling of the voluminous literature, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility 
Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); 
Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); and A. Benja-
min Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
132  See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749 (1998); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, In Their Words: Attorney Views About Costs 
and Procedures in Federal Civil Litigation 28 (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf (documenting a tendency 
among practicing attorneys to plead with more specificity than notice pleading would require); see also 
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003) (noting that courts 
often expect more than mere notice pleading and that current pleading practices are often “a far cry” 
from notice pleading). 
133  129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct al-
leged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)); see also Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the 
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 889 (2009) (“The major impact of Twombly . . . is 
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legal ruling, the Mitchell case allows us to see why particularity may have 
made sense for plaintiffs even before the Supreme Court found a version of 
it in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.  If the parties’ joint desire for legal 
clarification explains a part of the particularity phenomenon, it suggests that 
the Twombly–Iqbal framework may not dramatically alter the degree of par-
ticularity one can expect to find in the complaints of plaintiffs bringing 
novel claims.  Rather, as others have suggested, the new and potentially dis-
ruptive feature of Twombly–Iqbal may be its introduction of a plausibility 
standard that goes beyond notice and particularity to require nonconclusory 
allegations that tend to show some support for the claims.134  The same mo-
tivations that drove plaintiffs to plead specific facts under a notice-pleading 
scheme would make our proposal viable: plaintiffs often wish to secure ear-
lier determinations of the law. 
In a case like Mitchell, just as in the case of Nystrom, the district court 
judge may well recognize that the parties share an interest in securing inter-
locutory review at the appellate level.  Under current law, the parties’ desire 
to facilitate such review may exert subtle pressure on the district court’s 
evaluation of the defendant’s motion to dismiss in a close case.  Dismissal 
not only removes the action from the court’s docket but also provides a fi-
nal judgment suitable for appellate review by the court with essentially final 
authority over the viability of a novel claim.135  With the prospect of agreed-
upon appellate review, district courts might feel less inclined to ripen close 
cases through dismissal, thereby removing a possible source of subtle bias 
from the district court’s decisional process. 
3. Settlement Agreements That Provide for Appellate Adjudication.—
Parties sometimes stipulate that their settlement of a dispute will depend in 
part on the way an appellate court resolves an issue that arose in the course 
of litigation.  For example, in John Doe 1 v. Abbott Laboratories, the de-
 
not so much what it says about the pleading standard, but rather what it says about discovery costs and 
settlement leverage as well as the ineffectiveness of case management more generally.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 
25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 79 (2007) (suggesting that the Court employed the same rationale for ap-
plying the tend-to-exclude standard that it had applied to summary judgment in Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), to a motion to dismiss in Twombly: “the basic 
facts alleged in the complaint cannot amount to a credible case of the ultimate fact”). 
134  Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 823 (2010) (arguing that the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal “invent[ed] a new and foggy test 
for the threshold stage of every lawsuit [and therefore] have destabilized the entire system of civil litiga-
tion”); Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts Af-
ter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852, 857 (2008) (arguing that “no one 
quite understands what [Twombly] holds” because the opinion “replaced the ‘no set of facts’ language 
[from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)] with a new standard grounded in . . . ‘plausibility’” while 
eschewing “any notion that it was imposing a heightened pleading requirement”). 
135  Of course, a denial of a motion to dismiss would not be appealable until the final judgment had 
been entered.  See, e.g., Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. Telechem Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
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fendants appealed from the denial of motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment.136  Prior to seeking interlocutory review, the parties had struc-
tured a “high–low” settlement that involved: (1) an initial settlement pay-
ment of $10 million by the defendants; (2) an agreement to seek 
certification of interlocutory review; and (3) a possible additional payment 
of up to $17.5 million depending on the outcome of the appeal.137  The exis-
tence of these types of settlements confirms that parties will sometimes 
agree that an appellate resolution of a legal issue on which the district court 
cannot decisively rule will best facilitate settlement.  Such agreements also 
suggest that the parties’ calculations of settlement ranges depend on predic-
tions about the likely outcome of appellate litigation.138 
High–low agreements have become an accepted feature of practice at 
the trial level; such agreements typically provide that the amount of the set-
tlement will depend on the jury’s resolution of the case.139  The example of 
Abbott Laboratories provides some evidence that these agreements now in-
clude appellate contingencies as well.  But the use of high–low agreements 
on appeal has proven controversial; indeed, some appellate courts have re-
fused on justiciability grounds to assert appellate jurisdiction over a dispute 
framed by a high–low agreement.140  While we understand the appellate 
courts’ concern with the parties’ ability to purchase a judicial precedent, we 
view appellate high–low agreements as essentially benign and deserving of 
encouragement in most cases.141  Such agreements certainly confirm our in-
tuitive and theoretical perception that the parties consider the cost of appel-
late review and the likelihood of appellate reversal when evaluating the 
wisdom of settling the case or taking it to trial. 
4. Judicialization: The Shift from Jury to Judicial Resolution.—This 
section documents a trend toward what we call judicialization—the trans-
 
136  571 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). 
137  Id. 
138  See supra Part I.B. 
139  In a high–low agreement, the plaintiff and the defendant agree to set a floor and a ceiling for 
damages.  The jury hears the case, but the contract specifies that the amount changing hands will depend 
on whether the jury renders a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant.  See Malick v. Seaview Lincoln Mer-
cury, 940 A.2d 1221, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (stating that a high–low agreement is a con-
tract and subject, therefore, to traditional rules of contract interpretation); Cunha v. Shapiro, 
837 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162–64 (App. Div. 2007) (treating a high–low agreement as a settlement); 3 ATLA’S 
LITIGATING TORT CASES § 33:26 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., West & ATLA 
2003) (describing high–low agreements); see also Prescott, Spier & Yoon, supra note 80 (empirically 
studying high–low agreements).  Such an agreement allows a plaintiff to ensure that she can recover at 
least something from the action, even if the jury returns a defense verdict.  At the same time, the agree-
ment protects the defendant from an excessively large damage award, especially one that might exceed 
its liability insurance coverage. 
140  See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005).  This case is 
discussed infra Part II.B. 
141  We explore the problems of justiciability infra Part II.B. 
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formation of fact questions (previously sent to the jury) into issues of law 
for the judge to resolve.  We have already seen one example in the patent 
field where the Supreme Court shifted to judicial resolution of claim con-
struction issues that juries had previously resolved.142  We have also seen 
that judicialization increases the demand for early appellate resolution of 
crucial issues; claim construction questions led the parties in Nystrom to 
agree on the need for interlocutory review.  We think we can generalize 
from the lesson of Nystrom: as courts control more issues, parties will tend 
to demand greater access to the appellate courts for a definitive resolution.  
Juries still have a role to play, but appellate courts conduct de novo review 
of matters of law and owe no deference to the trial court’s determination.143  
We suspect that, with the growth in judicialization, parties will continue to 
seek readier access to decisive rulings on issues of law from appellate 
courts. 
a. Qualified immunity.—The Court’s well-known decision in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald144 provides a textbook case of judicialization.  There, 
the Court altered the test for qualified immunity in constitutional tort litiga-
tion, ending the fact-bound inquiry into the official’s mental state and shift-
ing to an assessment of whether the officer violated “clearly established” 
legal norms.145  Under the old approach, disputes over official immunity of-
ten necessitated a jury trial to resolve the subjective good faith of the officer 
as a matter of fact.146  The Harlow Court shifted from a subjective to an ob-
jective inquiry, transforming the issue of immunity into a matter of law to 
facilitate summary judgment.147 
An interesting change in appellate practice accompanied Harlow’s ju-
dicialization of the qualified immunity standard.  In 1985, the Court ruled 
that government officials could seek interlocutory appellate review of non-
final decisions rejecting motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds.148  Although such orders were not technically 
 
142  See supra note 89–91 and accompanying text. 
143  See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[C]laim con-
struction, as a purely legal issue, is subject to de novo review on appeal.”); Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 
434, 436 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the application of the Daubert framework is subject to de novo re-
view in the court of appeals). 
144  457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
145  See id. at 818 (extending immunity to officials so long as they do not violate clearly established 
federal law).  For a critique of this one-size-fits-all standard of qualified immunity and constitutional 
remedies, see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000). 
146  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
147  See id. at 815–18 (emphasizing the need for an objective standard to facilitate summary adjudi-
cation of insubstantial claims). 
148  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527–30 (1985). 
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final,149 the Court found in Mitchell v. Forsyth that they satisfied the terms 
of the collateral order doctrine.150  The decision was, to say the least, a de-
parture from established doctrine.  The collateral order doctrine applies 
when the district court conclusively resolves an important issue that is sepa-
rate from the merits and that cannot be effectively reviewed after a final 
judgment.151  Decisions rejecting a qualified immunity defense may well sa-
tisfy the conclusiveness and importance prongs of the analysis, but they do 
not turn on questions separate from the merits and do not evade review.  Af-
ter all, following the Court’s refinement of qualified immunity law in Har-
low, the existence of the immunity depends almost entirely on the merits of 
the plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  Only claims to vindicate clearly estab-
lished rights may proceed to judgment.  Immunity issues thus overlap with 
the merits to a substantial degree.  They also present questions of law that 
an appellate court can review after a final judgment.  The Court worked 
around these doctrinal rough patches by reconceptualizing qualified immun-
ity for purposes of review in the federal system as a right not to stand tri-
al;152 so viewed, the right was portrayed as one that could not be effectively 
vindicated without interlocutory review of the immunity issue during the 
pretrial phase of the litigation.153 
Mitchell’s provision for interlocutory review provides an interesting 
window on our proposal.  Resolution of the qualified immunity issue will 
play a central role in the prospects for settlement.  In such cases, especially 
where anticipated trial costs are high, the plaintiff and the defendant might 
have a shared interest in securing an early determination of the legal suffi-
ciency of the plaintiff’s claim.  Thus, had the Court not made such review 
available to government officials as of right, one can easily imagine plain-
 
149  For the classic definition of technical finality, see Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 
(1945), which defines technical finality as an order that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” 
150  472 U.S. at 525–30 (extending to government officers a right to interlocutory appellate review of 
decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense because, as a purported immunity from suit, it would 
otherwise be permanently lost). 
151  Id. at 544–45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
152  See id. at 526 (majority opinion).  One might assume, based on this conception of qualified im-
munity as immunity from trial, that the state courts would owe a similar obligation to provide interlocu-
tory review of rejected qualified immunity claims.  But the Court does not agree.  See Johnson v. 
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916–17 (1997) (rejecting the argument that state courts must make available in-
terlocutory review of rejected claims of qualified immunity in the context of a § 1983 claim against state 
officials).  Because the federal government removes Bivens actions to federal court as a matter of course, 
the state courts would predictably have little opportunity to evaluate the need for interlocutory review of 
a rejected qualified immunity defense by a federal officer.  See John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies 
in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 762 n.199 (2008). 
153  See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (holding that the qualified immunity doctrine is meant to protect 
government officials from the “‘costs of trial or . . . the burdens of broad-reaching discovery’ in cases 
where the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time” 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982))). 
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tiffs and officers agreeing to pursue interlocutory review before incurring 
the costs of trial.  One might also expect that the categorical approach pro-
viding for the routine availability of interlocutory review leads to the asser-
tion of some relatively frivolous appeals by government officials who wish 
to delay the trial.  One might see some evidence of the Court’s impatience 
with such appeals in Johnson v. Jones, where the Court unanimously cut 
back on the scope of collateral order review for relatively fact-bound quali-
fied immunity issues.154  Finally, one might sensibly predict that the pros-
pects for the settlement of Bivens actions will sharply improve following a 
decision definitively rejecting an officer’s immunity defense.  A recent 
study suggests, in fact, that plaintiffs secure higher settlement rates in Bi-
vens litigation than has been previously supposed;155 even Iqbal’s claims 
were reportedly settled after he amended his complaint on remand to satisfy 
the Court’s more demanding pleading standard.156 
This change in immunity law also worked a fundamental alteration in 
the litigation of constitutional torts.  Shortly after Harlow came down, the 
lower federal courts began to insist that the plaintiff furnish allegations de-
tailed enough to support a conclusion that the government official violated 
clearly established norms.157  Eventually, the Court confirmed this conclu-
sion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, concluding that its plausibility standard applied to 
all claims, including constitutional tort claims against high government of-
ficials.158  One can see the conclusion of this transformative series of deci-
 
154  515 U.S. 304, 313–17 (1995).  Justice Breyer wrote for a unanimous Court in concluding that an 
immediate appeal was not available from an order denying an official’s immunity-based summary 
judgment motion.  Id. at 313.  Unlike the order in Mitchell, which involved an interpretation of law and 
its application to an undisputed set of facts, see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 515, the order in Johnson was 
based on a trial judge’s finding that there was sufficient factual matter in the summary judgment record 
to create a genuine issue for the jury to resolve.  Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313–17.  The Court found that the 
collateral order doctrine did not apply to such an order: the issue was too fact-bound (unlike the legal 
question addressed in Mitchell), it was not really separate from the merits in the sense that the same sort 
of issues could well arise after the trial, and it presented issues of factual detail that the district court was 
better suited to address than the appellate court.  Id. at 314–15. 
155  See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for 
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 841–42 & fig.4 (2010) (reporting a success rate in 
Bivens litigation of approximately 30%). 
156  E-mail from Alexander Reinert, Attorney for Javaid Iqbal, to James Pfander, Professor of Law, 
Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:52 PM) (on file with author). 
157  See Siegert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 800–02 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (collecting examples of lower court 
decisions that applied a heightened pleading standard for constitutional tort claims).  In Siegert, the 
plaintiff’s allegations of malice apparently met the standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but the lower court found that a more demanding pleading standard applied to claims seeking 
to overcome qualified immunity.  See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231–32 (1991) (noting that the 
allegations were based on “malice,” which under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
“may be alleged generally”). 
158  129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).  Iqbal therefore requires that the district court judge make the fact-
bound decision of whether the plaintiff has “nudged [his] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to 
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sions in the Court’s description of the issue in Iqbal: whether the plaintiff 
pleaded sufficient factual matter that, “if taken as true, state[d] a claim that 
[government officials] deprived him of his clearly established constitutional 
rights.”159  By incorporating the qualified immunity standard into the plain-
tiff’s burden of pleading, the Court facilitated the use of the Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to secure an early determination of the viability of the plaintiff’s le-
gal theory and the plausibility of the claim. 
b. Reliability of expert testimony.—Two Supreme Court opi-
nions shifted, at least partially, the responsibility for determining the credi-
bility of expert testimony from the jury to the judge.  The 1993 decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held that the district court 
judge has a gatekeeping responsibility to determine whether the scientific 
testimony of expert witnesses is reliable and relevant enough to reach the 
jury.160  In doing so, the Court “recognize[d] that, in practice, a gatekeeping 
role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will pre-
vent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.”161  In 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, decided in 1999, the Court expanded this 
gatekeeping role to include not only scientific testimony but also any testi-
mony requiring “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.162  Of course, 
the prerequisite inquiry for the Daubert–Kumho evaluation—whether the 
testimony involves scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge—is 
itself necessarily a question for the judge.  Daubert and Kumho created a 
new pretrial battleground where litigants attempt to knock out each other’s 
experts, not through the traditional tools of cross-examination but before 
they appear in front of the jury.163 
As with other instances of judicialization, the Daubert test for expert 
witnesses creates situations in which the parties might sensibly demand in-
terlocutory review, as the Seventh Circuit decision in Fuesting v. Zimmer, 
Inc. illustrates.164  In suing for personal injuries, the plaintiff contended that 
the manufacturer of his prosthetic knee had defectively designed the sterili-
 
plausible.”  Id. at 1951 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
159  Id. at 1943. 
160  509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
161  Id. at 597. 
162  526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
163  See Sandra F. Gavin, Managerial Justice in a Post-Daubert World: A Reliability Paradigm, 
234 F.R.D. 196, 197 (2006). 
164  See Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. (Fuesting III), 362 F. App’x 560 (7th Cir. 2010); Fuesting v. Zim-
mer, Inc. (Fuesting I), 421 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2005).  Like Nystrom, see supra notes 94–120 and accom-
panying text, the Fuesting case appeared more than once in the court of appeals.  Even prior to Daubert, 
commentators noted that using tools such as ADR to resolve scientific issues might facilitate settlement.  
See Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution?, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 171, 193 (finding there may be a role for judges in obtaining 
agreement from parties to develop ADR solutions to scientific disputes). 
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zation process of the implant.165  The key witness in support of Fuesting was 
Dr. Pugh, an expert who testified that Zimmer’s faulty sterilization proce-
dures caused the implant to fail.166  Before trial, Zimmer attempted to have 
Dr. Pugh excluded as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 
and Daubert.167  The district court denied the motion in limine and the trial 
began, resulting in a jury verdict for Fuesting.168 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Daubert ruling of the district court.169  
Conducting de novo review of the district court’s determination, the circuit 
court found that the Daubert inquiry was inadequate because, although Dr. 
Pugh had the requisite credentials, his methodology did not have the neces-
sary indicia of reliability.170  The court therefore remanded for a new trial.171  
At the second trial, Fuesting put forth a new expert, Dr. Rose.172  This time, 
the district court excluded the testimony of Dr. Rose.173  Without the testi-
mony of Dr. Rose, Fuesting was unable to show causation, and the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.174  On appeal, 
the Seventh Circuit, reflecting the perception that the admissibility of expert 
testimony was a matter for courts to resolve, conducted its own independent 
analysis of whether Dr. Rose’s testimony met the Daubert test and affirmed 
the decision of the district court.175    
The Seventh Circuit’s handling of Fuesting nicely illustrates the way 
that judicialization can increase the demand for interlocutory review.  Like 
the novel legal theory in Mitchell v. Archibald & Kendall, Inc.,176 novel 
theories of causation presented by experts may be decisive in complex 
products liability and medical malpractice cases.  If the case goes to the 
jury, acceptance of the expert’s testimony provides a sound basis for liabili-
ty.  If Daubert forecloses admission of the expert’s testimony, by contrast, 
and no other expert can be identified, then the plaintiff cannot get to the 
jury.  Immediate review of the initial (nonfinal) decision to allow Dr. Pugh 
to testify could have saved the parties the cost of an expensive trial and 
 
165  Fuesting I, 421 F.3d at 530. 
166  Id. at 531–32. 
167  Id. at 532. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at 537. 
170  Id. at 535. 
171  The court initially remanded with instructions to direct a verdict for the defendant.  Id. at 537–
38.  On rehearing, the court vacated the part of the opinion directing the district court to enter judgment 
for the defendant, finding that the proper remedy, based on Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-
Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006), was to grant a new trial.  Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc. (Fuesting II), 
448 F.3d 936, 937 (7th Cir. 2006). 
172  Fuesting III, 362 F. App’x 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2010). 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. at 562–64. 
176  See supra notes 121–30 and accompanying text. 
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could have highlighted the need for the plaintiff to identify another expert.  
Depending on the prospects for locating an expert to fill Dr. Pugh’s shoes, 
the parties might have consented to such interlocutory review, knowing that 
the Daubert issue would remain a threat to any plaintiff’s jury verdict.177  
We cannot say that the parties would have agreed to such review in this 
case, given our uncertainty about the parties’ actual valuations of the case 
and their perception of the likelihood of appellate reversal.  But we can 
easily imagine that Daubert issues, like those in Fuesting, could give rise to 
situations in which agreed-upon appellate review would make sense to both 
parties. 
Other examples of judicialization abound.  We can see evidence of 
similar trends in such far-flung fields as patent litigation,178 corporate law,179 
antitrust law.180  Even in situations in which the federal courts have made no 
change in the balance between judge and jury, the growth of federal statuto-
ry law has tended to provide a more detailed legal framework within which 
 
177  Of course, one might argue that interlocutory review could present problems of piecemeal re-
view to the extent that it would have allowed the plaintiff to put forth a succession of witnesses (or me-
thodologies) until he found one that the appellate court would accept.  For a variety of reasons, we do 
not envision a problem of serial appeals.  Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has any incentive to put 
forth a weak witness; rather, they will tend to offer their strongest witness in the first proceeding.  To the 
extent that a party has several equally strong witnesses, the party will often present them as a group, thus 
enabling the district court to evaluate all the witnesses in a single proceeding.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. 
Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 779 (10th Cir. 1999) (recounting plaintiff’s proposal to have four physi-
cians testify at trial).  In any case, the parade-of-witness problem arises only if the plaintiff perceives the 
defendant’s challenge to any particular witness as posing a serious risk of appellate reversal.  As with 
other examples of agreed-upon appellate review, review of Daubert issues will likely target those that 
most clearly warrant review.  The requirement that both the parties and the district court agree should 
limit the ability of one party (or even both parties) to game the system. 
178  While it is not yet clear, the Supreme Court’s holding in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 
may be an indication that the question of obviousness, including perhaps the factual underpinnings, is 
one for the judge and not the jury.  See 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“The ultimate judgment of obvious-
ness is a legal determination.”); see also Meng Ouyang, Note, The Procedural Impact of KSR on Patent 
Litigation, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 158, 159–62 (2009) (explaining that some believe that KSR 
moved the question of obviousness from the jury to the judge and that Judge Matthew Kennelly believes 
that it has not). 
179  For example, the Seventh Circuit found that, because the controlling Illinois state law treated the 
question of piercing the corporate veil as one of equity, it was to be determined by a judge and not a 
jury.  See Int’l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Can., Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). 
180  Because antitrust law limits what inferences can be drawn from ambiguous evidence, see Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986), the determination of sum-
mary judgment motions can be very fact-bound.  The judge must compare the reasonableness of the 
alleged conduct to that of independent action by the defendants.  See id. (requiring a court, in determin-
ing whether summary judgment is proper, to consider whether “the inference of conspiracy is reasona-
ble” and the facts of “the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its 
implementation”); see also id. at 599 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court makes a number of assump-
tions that invade the factfinder’s province.”). 
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factfinders must operate in resolving issues of federal liability.181  With the 
growth of statutes and the legal questions they inevitably pose comes a cor-
responding demand for appellate review as parties seek answers from the 
only body that can finally resolve the issue.  Our proposal addresses this 
demand for review by empowering the parties and the district court to make 
review available when they all agree that it would help resolve the case. 
II. PREDICTABLE CONCERNS WITH PARTY-AUTONOMOUS APPELLATE 
REVIEW 
Despite our perception that both the parties and the system have much 
to gain from agreed-upon interlocutory review, we can imagine objections 
to making such review more readily available.  We address those objections 
in this Part of the Article.  We first tackle a set of concerns that may attend 
any proposed expansion of interlocutory review, concerns driven by the 
policies underlying the final judgment rule.  We next consider the justicia-
bility concerns that might appear to arise from the fact that both parties 
have agreed to seek review.  We show that the fact of agreement alone does 
not create a feigned-case problem under Article III.  Finally, we consider 
two possible concerns that might arise from what we will call the “likely in-
cidence” of such agreed-upon review.  Some may oppose the proposal on 
the ground that it will burden the appellate courts with too many cases; oth-
ers may oppose it on the ground that the proposal has no practical value be-
cause the parties will too rarely agree to interlocutory review.  We say to 
both groups: let us test the proposal in a trial run and evaluate the results.  
The need for ongoing evaluation suggests that there might be an advantage 
to adopting the proposed rule through the rules advisory process.  The Judi-
cial Conference Committee on Civil Rules—or its newly formed joint Civ-
il/Appellate Subcommittee182—can provide ongoing review and oversight of 
new rules of interlocutory review, making necessary adjustments in light of 
the practical experience that emerges. 
A. Erosion of the Final Judgment Rule 
One can question our suggested reliance on party agreement to identify 
issues for interlocutory review on the familiar basis that it would undermine 
the final judgment rule.  Although this argument applies to any proposed 
 
181  On the rise of statutes, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 
(1982), which describes an “orgy of statute making” and a resulting “statutorification” of American law, 
and Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
182  See Memorandum from Judge Carl E. Stewart, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Judge Lee H. Ro-
senthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 7 (May 8, 2009), available at http://host4.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/AP05-2009.pdf (noting the formation of the subcommittee and including the manufactured 
finality doctrine on its list of topics to consider). 
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expansion of interlocutory review, it deserves serious consideration.  In 
evaluating the possible concern with erosion, we note that scholars have 
long taken the view that the final judgment rule should operate less as an 
absolute prohibition and more as a presumptive guidepost.183  Today, a lead-
ing casebook explains that “the goal has been to identify those trial rulings 
that should be eligible for an immediate appeal rather than have their appeal 
postponed until a final judgment disposes of the entire dispute.”184  In this 
section, we will briefly sketch the elements of the final judgment rule and 
explain why our proposal will yield appeals that do not offend the rule. 
The classic justification for the final judgment rule has been to avoid 
the premature, fragmentary, and repetitive appeal of matters first resolved at 
the trial court level.185  If we break down these elements, we can see a num-
ber of considerations at work.  As for the concern with prematurity, appel-
late courts rightly expect that some appeals might be avoided or obviated if 
the final judgment rule were applied.186  Thus, to return to our example of 
the nonfinal district court rejection of a proffered statute of limitations de-
fense, some defendants might win on the merits at trial, thus avoiding liabil-
ity and obviating the need for appellate resolution of the limitations issue.  
As for the concern with fragmentation, appellate courts often feel that they 
can better address the fundamental issues in a case if they see the issues 
against the backdrop of a full record; fragmentary appeals may not bring in-
to view all of the issues that might properly influence an appellate deci-
sion.187  As for the concern with repetition, appellate courts rightly resist 
interlocutory review of issues that could return to the appellate docket later 
 
183  See Redish, supra note 12, at 90 (noting how Congress and the courts have “mitigate[d] the 
harshness and occasional absurdity of inflexible insistence on finality in all situations”). 
184  DANIEL J. MEADOR, THOMAS E. BAKER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: 
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 49 (2d ed. 2006). 
185  Id. 
186  The possibility that an issue might be obviated by further proceedings at the trial court level has 
played a somewhat inconsistent role in Supreme Court decisions cutting back on the final judgment rule.  
Compare Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 127 (1945) (allowing review of a nonfinal 
state court decision on the ground that further proceedings could not obviate the federal question), with 
N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 163–64 (1973) (emphasizing 
that further proceedings might obviate the federal question as a factor supporting a finding of finality), 
and Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers’ Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 549–51 (1963) (noting that 
the union might, in theory, prevail in a state court trial but concluding that this prospect of obviation 
should not prevent immediate review of the state court’s rejection of the union’s claim that federal labor 
law foreclosed state court authority to adjudicate a labor dispute). 
187  There are numerous examples of the somewhat formulaic invocation of the importance of a full 
record.  See, e.g., In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Without a full record 
and without the benefit of an adversarial proceeding, the appellate court would be in a particularly poor 
position to pass on the propriety of the district court’s exercise of discretion.”); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 
16 F.3d 1363, 1372 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Even though the district court decided the matter on a motion for 
summary judgment, we cannot say that the development of a full factual record at a trial on the action on 
the notes might not be of assistance to us in deciding the issues raised on this appeal.”). 
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in the form of an appeal from a final judgment.188  The Supreme Court’s de-
cision to curtail interlocutory review of fact-bound issues of qualified im-
munity was based in good measure on concerns with the prospect of 
repetitive review.189 
We do not believe that agreed-upon interlocutory review will offend 
these elemental features of the final judgment rule.  Consider first the prob-
lem of obviation.  One can certainly imagine situations in which defendants 
will succeed at trial, thus obviating any need for appellate resolution of le-
gal defenses to liability.  But such defense verdicts on liability will likely 
occur in situations in which both parties view the case on liability as some-
thing of a toss-up.  In such cases, the prospect of interlocutory appellate re-
view does not create a settlement range where one did not previously exist; 
indeed, interlocutory review may reduce the expected settlement value of 
the case from the plaintiff’s perspective.190  This comports with our intuition 
that plaintiffs in doubtful cases on liability will tend to press forward to a 
 
188  For an expression of general concern with duplicative appeals, see India Breweries, Inc. v. Mil-
ler Brewing Co., which notes the general rule that an order that disposes of less than all of the claims 
does not satisfy the requirement of finality because the “remaining elements are apt to come back on a 
second appeal.”  612 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting First Health Grp. Corp. v. BCE Emergis 
Corp., 269 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Court’s collateral or-
der doctrine was framed with this problem in mind.  Thus, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
the Court emphasized that the question at issue—the plaintiff’s obligation under state law to post a bond 
before pursuing a shareholder’s derivative action—was separate from the merits and could not be effec-
tively reviewed after the entry of judgment at trial.  337 U.S. 541, 544–46 (1949).  The requirement that 
collateral orders remain separate from the merits and evade review after final judgment has remained 
part of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (holding that the 
denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens was not sufficiently separate from the 
merits to warrant immediate review under the collateral order doctrine). 
189  See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1995) (refusing to allow collateral order review of 
a district court decision denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds, reasoning that the fact-bound nature of the summary judgment motion meant that the same is-
sue and facts could well arise in the wake of a final judgment). 
190  In Part I.B, we considered the settlement prospects in a case where the plaintiff and defendant 
both assessed the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at 90% if a pretrial ruling stood, but assigned differ-
ent values (80% and 50%, respectively) to whether the ruling would be upheld on appeal.  Under those 
assumptions, we found that the parties would likely agree to interlocutory review to enable them to settle 
the case without proceeding to trial.  When we assume, by contrast, that both parties reckon the plain-
tiff’s success at trial at only 50% if the ruling stands and 20% if it is reversed, the introduction of inter-
locutory review has a different effect.  As we did previously, consider $100 to be the anticipated jury 
award, $10 to be the cost of trial, and $2 to be the cost of appeal.  Under the final judgment rule there 
would be a settlement range because the plaintiff would accept anything over $28 [(0.8 × 0.5 × 100) – 
10 – 2 = 28] and the defendant would pay up to $37 [(0.5 × 0.5 × 100) + 10 + 2 = 37].  Immediate re-
view of the ruling might put the plaintiff in a worse bargaining position.  While the settlement range 
would go up if the court of appeals upheld the ruling (the plaintiff would accept anything over $40 
[(0.5 × 100) – 10 = 40] and the defendant will pay up to $60 [(0.5 × 100) + 10 = 60]), it would go down 
if the ruling were reversed.  The settlement range after a reversal would be between $10 [(0.2 × 100) – 
10 = 10] and $30 [(0.2 × 100) + 10 = 30].  A well-advised plaintiff would either reject interlocutory re-
view in this situation or consent to interlocutory review only as a part of a pre-appeal settlement to 
hedge against the risk of losing the appeal. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1084 
jury verdict in an effort to secure a settlement offer from risk-averse defen-
dants who might agree to settle to cap their potential liability and reduce the 
threat of a runaway jury.  Thus, both our intuition and our simple model 
predict that the parties will be unlikely to agree to interlocutory appellate 
review when they anticipate a strong likelihood of a defense verdict that 
would obviate the need for appellate review. 
Just as we do not anticipate that the parties will agree to interlocutory 
review when the case affords a realistic prospect that further proceedings 
will obviate the need for review, we do not view fragmentation and repeti-
tion as likely stumbling blocks to our proposal.  Parties tend to agree on the 
need for interlocutory review only where the case turns on a relatively 
clear-cut issue about which the appellate court has the final say.  The more 
clear-cut the legal question, the less likely it is to benefit from a more fully 
developed record.  Moreover, clear-cut legal questions do not pose a threat 
of repetition; once settled, the legal disposition will control the remainder of 
the litigation.  In assessing an expert’s qualifications (as in our hypothetical 
case)191 or a novel claim for relief (as in the case of Mitchell v. Archibald & 
Kendall, Inc.),192 the appellate court will resolve the matter once and for all 
(subject to the possibility of Supreme Court review).193  Whatever conclu-
sion the jury reaches as to liability (assuming the case returns there for trial 
disposition), we would not ordinarily expect the appellate court to revisit 
legal conclusions already reached in the course of interlocutory review.194 
 
191  See supra Part I.B, I.C.4. 
192  573 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1978); see supra Part I.C.2. 
193  Federal law empowers the Court to review “[c]ases in the courts of appeals” by writ of certiorari 
“before or after rendition of judgment.”  28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).  For an account of the requirement 
that the case be “in” the court of appeals, see EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
79, 83–84 (9th ed. 2007), which observes that “a case is considered ‘in’ the court of appeals at and from 
the moment it is docketed in that court.”  As long as the circuit courts have jurisdiction of the issue on 
interlocutory review, the Supreme Court may exercise review by way of certiorari. 
194  To be sure, the Nystrom case illustrates the possibility that appellate court resolution of some 
fact-bound questions, such as the claim construction decision on which the parties sought appellate re-
view, may produce some fragmentation and repetition.  That case has made at least three trips to the 
Federal Circuit already.  But these extra trips are likely due to the unavailability of interlocutory review 
on the claim construction.  The first appeal was dismissed because it improperly attempted to obtain in-
terlocutory review of the initial claim construction.  See Nystrom I, 339 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The 
second, addressing the claim construction on the merits, was reversed on the construction of one of the 
claim terms.  See Nystrom II, 424 F.3d 1136, 1146–48 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  While this construction made 
clear that Nystrom could not win under a theory that TREX had literally infringed, he still attempted to 
pursue the case under the theory that TREX had infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.  Nystrom 
III, 580 F.3d 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  The district court ruled, however, that because Nystrom had 
stipulated to noninfringement, he had waived his doctrine of equivalents argument.  Id.  This led to the 
third appeal, in which the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the doctrine of equiva-
lents argument had been waived.  Id. at 1285.  Had Nystrom been working under our rule, however, two 
of these appeals would have been avoided.  First, it would only have taken one trip to the Federal Circuit 
to get a definitive ruling on the claim construction.  Second, because getting that ruling would not have 
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B. Feigned-Case Problems Under Article III 
Among the many other limits Article III imposes on the exercise of 
judicial power, it forbids the federal courts from hearing feigned or collu-
sive cases.195  As a consequence, the federal courts may not proclaim the 
law except in cases of “honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights.”196  
The requirement of adversariness might appear to pose an Article III barrier 
to our proposal.  After all, we propose to allow the parties to procure an ap-
pellate court’s resolution of a legal question by agreeing with one another 
that such review would be mutually beneficial.  Some courts might take the 
view that the parties’ agreement as to the need for appellate review violates 
the prohibition against feigned or collusive cases and thus presents a juris-
dictional bar to the exercise of appellate review.  In cases in which the par-
ties enter into settlement agreements, conditionally resolving their dispute 
subject to the appellate court’s resolution of an outstanding issue, justicia-
bility issues might appear especially acute. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc. il-
lustrates the concern.197  In a cease-and-desist letter, clothing manufacturer 
L.L. Bean demanded that Gator stop interfering with L.L. Bean’s website 
by opening pop-up advertisements for competitor Eddie Bauer.198  In re-
sponse to Gator’s action for declaratory relief, L.L. Bean moved to dismiss 
on the ground that the federal district court in northern California lacked 
personal jurisdiction over it.199  After the district court granted the motion, 
Gator sought review.200  A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding 
that L.L. Bean was subject to both general and specific jurisdiction in Cali-
fornia.201  After en banc review was granted and the case was fully briefed 
and argued, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settle-
ment of the underlying litigation.202  Instead of asking the court to dismiss 
the appeal, the parties specifically requested that the court provide a ruling 
on the personal jurisdiction issue.203  The settlement provided for a winding 
 
required Nystrom to stipulate to noninfringement, there would have been no issue as to whether he had 
waived his doctrine of equivalents argument. 
195  On the feigned-case prohibition, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. 
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 94–100 (6th ed. 2009), and ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 50–51 (4th ed. 
2003), the latter of which discusses examples of cases dismissed by the Supreme Court where the parties 
colluded to obtain federal judicial resolution of their dispute. 
196  United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197  398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
198  Id. at 1127. 
199  Id. at 1127–28. 
200  Id. at 1128. 
201  Id. at 1134 (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting).  
202  Id. at 1128 (majority opinion). 
203  Id. 
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down of Gator’s practices and a payment to compensate L.L. Bean; it also 
required Gator to pay an additional $10,000 if the appellate court found that 
the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over L.L. Bean.204  The Ninth 
Circuit found that the settlement mooted the controversy and therefore dis-
missed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.205  The ruling might appear to cast 
some doubt on the viability of high–low settlement agreements that turn on 
the appellate court’s resolution of a disputed legal issue.206 
While the Ninth Circuit decision may appear to draw some support 
from recent developments in vacatur practice following a finding of moot-
ness,207 we do not believe the analogy holds and we question the mootness 
conclusion in Gator.com.  Findings of mootness on appeal in the federal 
system have long given rise to the practice of remanding the action with a 
directive that the lower court vacate its prior judgment and dismiss the 
case.208  Relying on this practice, institutional litigants began to settle cases 
on appeal in an effort to moot them and procure the vacatur of an opinion 
below that the litigant viewed as antithetical to its institutional interests.  
The Court rejected this practice of erasing judgments through settlement, 
ruling in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership that 
mootness by way of settlement does not typically “justify vacatur of a 
judgment under review.”209  Underlying the Court’s decision was the per-
ception that parties should not be allowed to purchase the negation of pre-
cedents they dislike through the settlement process.210  To the extent that the 
Ninth Circuit regarded L.L. Bean as attempting to purchase a favorable 
precedent, one can understand the court as having attempted to prevent ga-
mesmanship comparable to that involved in U.S. Bancorp. 
 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 1132. 
206  Subsequent decisions treat the Gator.com dismissal as reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the personal jurisdiction issue did not involve the merits of the case but was merely a side issue.  
See John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing Gator.com as a case in 
which a settlement of the merits of the declaratory judgment action mooted the case, leaving only the 
“side issue” of personal jurisdiction).  While this gloss helps to narrow the reach of the manufactured 
finality doctrine, the Gator.com decision nonetheless threatens the viability of contingent appellate set-
tlement agreements, at least to the extent that the issue the parties wish to press on appeal can be de-
scribed as collateral to the merits.  Many threshold procedural motions, such as motions to transfer or 
dismiss for improper venue or jurisdiction, as well as many dispositive legal defenses, such as a statute 
of limitations defense, might be characterized as side issues.  As a result, the Gator.com restriction poses 
a threat to the effective implementation of agreed-upon interlocutory review, at least when it occurs in 
the context of a contingent appellate settlement agreement. 
207  See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994). 
208  See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950). 
209  U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29.  For a critical evaluation of the practice that anticipated the Su-
preme Court’s conclusion, see Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Deci-
sional Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 (1991). 
210  See U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 26 (“Petitioner’s voluntary forfeiture of review constitutes a fail-
ure of equity that makes the burden [to show entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of vacatur] deci-
sive, whatever respondent’s share in the mooting of the case might have been.”). 
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Ultimately, however, we believe that the settlement practice criticized 
in U.S. Bancorp differs fundamentally from that at issue in Gator.com.  To 
see the difference, consider the position of the parties at the time they nego-
tiate their settlements.  In the U.S. Bancorp setting, the parties negotiate a 
settlement for the purpose of procuring the vacatur of a decision rendered in 
the context of an adversary proceeding.  They act, in short, to undo the 
binding quality of a judicial decision that they have come to regard as in-
convenient.  In the Gator.com setting, by contrast, the parties act not to un-
do an existing precedent but to secure the appellate court’s resolution of a 
disputed issue of law about which they have long disagreed.  They can ar-
gue to the court, but they cannot control the contours of the ultimate deci-
sion.  The threat underlying the U.S. Bancorp decision—that parties might 
settle their way out from under the precedential effect of federal decrees—
thus seems entirely absent from the Gator.com setting where the parties 
continue to press for a binding appellate resolution that will both control the 
resolution of their own dispute and provide a possible precedent for future 
disputes. 
Instead of drawing an analogy to the U.S. Bancorp setting, we think 
that the justiciability issues in Gator.com can be more aptly analogized to 
the declaratory judgment action.211  In many declaratory judgment proceed-
ings, the parties recognize that they have a genuine dispute about a question 
of law that will require judicial intervention.  For example, an insurance 
company might refuse to honor its contractual duty to defend and indemnify 
after concluding that its insurance contract has lapsed.212  Both the company 
and the insured might recognize the existence of an open question under the 
terms of the particular insurance contract.  They might further recognize 
that they cannot resolve the issue without the intervention of a neutral deci-
sionmaker.  They might agree to arbitrate their dispute or to initiate a decla-
ratory judgment action to clarify the contract’s applicability.213  Both parties 
might recognize the need for judicial intervention and might agree to secure 
it, but that joint interest in settlement of the dispute would not make the 
case a feigned proceeding.  As long as they genuinely contest the contrac-
 
211  The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act allows the federal courts to issue declaratory judgments 
in cases of “actual controversy.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).  At one time, the federal courts appeared re-
luctant to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings as a result of concerns with their justiciability un-
der Article III.  See FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 195, at 56.  But the Court 
promptly upheld the Act’s constitutionality as applied to a fairly concrete dispute over the interpretation 
of an insurance contract.  See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). 
212  See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 202:3 (3d ed. 2005) (“In 
case of doubt or dispute as to whether there is a duty to defend, based on dispute over whether an insur-
ance policy affords coverage for the conduct alleged in the complaint against the insured, a declaratory 
judgment action or motion may be brought to make the determination.”); cf., e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. 
v. Bowling Green Prof’l Assocs., 495 F.3d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 2007) (recounting that the insurance com-
pany argued that a car accident was the result of “medical” negligence and not ordinary negligence and 
that therefore there was no duty to defend under a general liability policy). 
213  See, e.g., Travelers, 495 F.3d at 268. 
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tual issue and have adequate incentives to do so, their agreement as to the 
need for a legal resolution should not bar the federal courts from hearing the 
case.214 
Parties who agree on the need for appellate review occupy much the 
same position toward one another as litigants who agree on the need for a 
declaratory judgment proceeding.  That is, the parties continue to dispute 
the issue of law they wish to present to the appellate court but agree on the 
need for its resolution.  Our proposal would, in effect, authorize the parties 
to seek a declaratory judgment from the appellate court upon agreement that 
the appellate decision would advance the resolution of their dispute.215  As 
long as the parties have an adequate financial incentive to pursue their op-
posing views of the issue on appeal, continued litigation at the appellate 
court level does not appear to threaten the requirement of adversary presen-
tation.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has twice upheld the justiciability of dis-
putes in the wake of the parties’ adoption of contingent appellate settlement 
agreements.216  The entry into such settlements did not moot the cases on 
appeal, in the Court’s view, because the amount of money changing hands 
between the parties was structured to turn on the Court’s resolution of a 
disputed legal question.  District courts, under our proposal, would have the 
authority to evaluate the terms of any contingent appellate settlement 
agreement and satisfy themselves as to the existence of that degree of ad-
versariness needed for further litigation under Article III.  Appellate courts 
could also inquire into the situation if doubts arose as to the existence of 
adversariness sufficient to sustain their appellate jurisdiction. 
 
214  In Travelers, although neither party raised jurisdictional issues, the court raised the issue sua 
sponte and found that the exercise of jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action was an abuse of 
discretion.  Id. at 271.  While the court found that the resolution of this declaratory judgment action 
would not settle the controversy or help to clarify the legal relationships between the parties, see id. at 
272, this may be a dubious determination.  Once the insurance provider clarified its duty to defend the 
insured, it could then enter into settlement negotiations with the third-party estates.  Until it was clear, 
however, that the insurance company had any duty to defend, those settlement negotiations would be 
impossible. 
215 Something similar underlies the Supreme Court’s decision to allow officials to appeal from a 
qualified immunity decision even though they prevailed in the lower court.  See Camreta v. Greene, 
131 S. Ct. 2020 ( 2011).  See generally James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: 
Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1630 (2011) (describing 
Camreta as approving applications for declaratory review of lower court decisions). 
216  See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743–44 (1982) (confirming the justiciability of the im-
munity issue on appeal, notwithstanding a settlement agreement under which Nixon paid $142,000 and 
would pay only an additional $28,000 if the Court found he was not absolutely immune); Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982) (upholding the justiciability of a class action appeal, de-
spite a settlement agreement that provided that the plaintiffs would receive either $400 apiece, or noth-
ing at all, depending on the outcome of the appeal). 
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C. Certification by the District Court 
Our proposal calls for the district court to certify an issue for interlocu-
tory review upon agreement of the parties.  We do not envision a terribly 
complex process of district court oversight.  The district court should simp-
ly examine the terms of the parties’ agreement (and any related side deals) 
to confirm that it provides for interlocutory review.  If the requisite meeting 
of the minds can be shown, the district court will ordinarily grant the re-
quested certification and authorize an appeal to the circuit court.  In the typ-
ical case, the parties will have identified a potentially controlling issue of 
law on which appellate guidance may play an important role in either the 
trial or settlement of the case.  Often, the district court will simply confirm 
the existence of such an issue and grant the requested certification. 
Our proposal differs from current law in two respects.  The current cer-
tification statute requires certification both by the district court and by the 
appellate court.  We would dispense with the appellate court’s role.  In ad-
dition, the current statute specifies a standard for certification, requiring that 
the order satisfy three separate criteria: it must involve a “controlling ques-
tion of law,” there must be “substantial ground for difference of opinion” 
about that question, and immediate review of the question must “materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”217  Our proposal does not 
attempt to describe the issues or interlocutory orders that we regard as fit 
subjects for interlocutory review.  Instead, we rely on the parties to identify 
such matters.  Ordinarily, the parties will identify matters for which interlo-
cutory review makes sense; the district court need not determine that the is-
sues meet a particular standard. 
Despite our perception of the district court’s role as relatively narrow, 
we do not believe that the district court would owe an obligation to certify 
in every instance in which the parties have so agreed.  (If the parties’ 
agreement were obligatory, there would be no reason to provide for district 
court review at all.)  Rather, we would expect the district court to perform 
two functions in addition to confirming the existence of an agreement by 
the parties.  First, the district court should examine the parties’ agreement to 
ensure that the disputed issue on appeal satisfies the Article III case-or-
controversy requirement.  Second, the district court should consider wheth-
er immediate review would threaten to undermine the effective case man-
agement of the pending litigation.  We can imagine situations in which both 
parties might wish to escape from a scheduling order or other case man-
agement decision by agreeing to appellate review (and the delay it would 
necessarily entail).  We can also imagine situations in which two parties to 
a dispute involving a wider array of litigants might wish to opt out of a 
scheduled trial or other proceeding by agreeing to appellate review.  If few-
er than all of the parties agree, we would expect the district court to consid-
 
217  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
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er the threat of piecemeal litigation that the proposal for review would 
present. 
In the end, though, we do not think it wise to specify all of the situa-
tions in which the district court might plausibly decline a requested certifi-
cation.  We think it enough to provide the district court with discretion to 
act in the interests of justice and in the spirit of deference to good-faith 
agreements to interlocutory review negotiated by the parties.  We doubt that 
we can anticipate all of the considerations that might inform the district 
court’s exercise of discretion and worry that a specification would result in 
an unnecessarily restrictive conception of district court authority.218  Some 
may worry that district courts would use the broad discretion we envision 
irresponsibly, perhaps by denying review of orders out of a self-interested 
desire to avoid reversal or in a wrongheaded belief that the order was indis-
putably correct or beyond reproach.  But our experience suggests that dis-
trict courts recognize the possibility of reversal as an inherent feature of 
appellate oversight and will take appropriate steps to facilitate review when 
the parties believe it would make sense.  It was precisely that spirit of good-
faith cooperation that motivated the district court in Nystrom and the same 
spirit of cooperation that today leads district judges to rely on the certifica-
tion power. 
D. The Incidence Question 
We expect that uncertainty about the incidence of agreed-upon interlo-
cutory review will lead to questions about our proposal.  (By “incidence,” 
we refer to the frequency with which the parties will agree to and district 
courts will approve interlocutory appellate review.)  Without concrete data 
on the expected incidence of party-driven review, we can only guess that 
our proposal will do more good than harm.  Some might point to the lack of 
incidence data in arguing that party agreements will inundate the appellate 
courts with a new collection of appeals, perhaps on mundane or routine 
questions, and will siphon away scarce appellate resources from more 
pressing matters.  Others might use the lack of incidence data to express the 
opposite concern: that the parties will too rarely agree to appellate review, 
thus making the proposal more of an academic exercise than a practical tool 
for the resolution of disputes.  We acknowledge the concern; one of the rea-
sons we label this Article a “preliminary analysis” is to capture a measure 
of our own uncertainty and to invite more scholarship. 
We can nonetheless offer some (preliminary) comments on the inci-
dence problem, focusing first on the threat to appellate dockets.  Both our 
model and our assessment of such interlocutory appeals like the ones in Ny-
 
218  For an insightful account of the challenges of law reform, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Revisiting 
the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 
564, 565 (1981), which notes the limits of the “collective mind.” 
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strom give us some confidence that the parties will not burden the appellate 
courts with a flood of appeals on matters that would otherwise work them-
selves out at the trial stage of the process.  Economic interests will tend to 
encourage the parties to agree on interlocutory review only of those disposi-
tive legal issues that they expect to survive (and potentially threaten) the 
lower court’s resolution of the case.  Precisely because the parties anticipate 
that those dispositive issues will survive for appellate adjudication, they 
will occasionally have incentives to get them addressed sooner rather than 
later.  As a consequence, we would expect substantial overlap between the 
issues that the parties identify for interlocutory review and those that they 
view as likely candidates for review in the wake of a final judgment.219  It 
thus seems likely that our proposal will not alter the mix of issues brought 
to the appellate courts so much as the timing of appellate court review.  In 
Nystrom, we observe, the appellate court agreed to make interlocutory re-
view available for claim construction issues that were likely to have sur-
vived any disposition of the case at the trial level.220 
If we can rely on the parties’ self-interest to identify serious issues for 
interlocutory appellate review that are likely to require appellate resolution 
in any case, can we also predict that they will agree with sufficient frequen-
cy to justify the adoption of a new rule?  We point first to the fact of in-
creasing judicialization, a trend that suggests that the number of dispositive 
legal issues will continue to grow and produce greater need for interlocuto-
ry review.  We also observe that the relative costs of trial and appellate liti-
gation tend to create conditions favorable to growing demand for 
interlocutory review.  At the trial level, the growing cost of e-discovery,221 
increased reliance on expert witnesses,222 and other factors have tended to 
 
219  As discussed above, in high-stakes litigation, the likelihood of appeal is great, and therefore the 
question is not about whether to appeal, but when.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
220  See supra note 117.  In general, if there are many claims at issue, and even one construction ap-
pears to disfavor the eventual loser at trial, an appeal seems likely.  As seen anecdotally through the case 
of Fuesting III, 362 F. App’x 560 (7th Cir. 2010), similar issues may arise in the area of qualification of 
expert testimony.  See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
221  For an account of the rise in e-discovery costs and the 2006 amendments to the civil rules that 
seek to address and apportion those costs, see Vlad Vainberg, Comment, When Should Discovery Come 
with a Bill? Assessing Cost Shifting for Electronic Discovery, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1523 (2010) 
222  The expenses associated with discovery of expert witnesses have produced ongoing rule 
changes, most recently in 2010.  See Damon Wright, Expert Discovery Returns to the Past, FED. LAW., 
Jan. 2011, at 32; see also Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 465 (D.R.I. 1985) (“Our citizens’ 
access to justice, which is at the core of our constitutional system of government, is under serious siege.  
Obtaining justice in this modern era costs too much.  The courts are among our most treasured institu-
tions.  And, if they are to remain strong and viable, they cannot sit idly by in the face of attempts to loot 
the system.  To be sure, expert witness fees are but the tip of an immense iceberg.  But, the skyrocketing 
costs of litigation have not sprung full-blown from nowhere.  Those costs are made up of bits and pieces, 
and relaxation of standards of fairness in one instance threatens further escalation across the board.  The 
effective administration of justice depends, in significant part, on the maintenance and enforcement of a 
reasoned cost/benefit vigil by the judiciary.”). 
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drive up the cost of obtaining a jury’s resolution on liability, especially in 
the types of cases that would be prime candidates for the exercise of inter-
locutory review as contemplated in our proposal.223  At the appellate level, 
by contrast, the trend runs in the opposite direction; such technological in-
novations as computerized legal research and word processing have reduced 
the relative cost of appellate practice over the past generation.224  Not sur-
prisingly, then, we find a strong demand for interlocutory review in precise-
ly those fields of litigation that are characterized by relatively high trial 
practice costs and relatively inexpensive appellate review.  Patent holders 
and other intellectual property litigants, in particular, have pressed Congress 
in recent years for legislation that would ease their access to the appellate 
courts for the interlocutory review of dispositive legal issues.225 
In addition, some decisions, such as claim construction and the admis-
sion of expert testimony, may be the subject of cross-motions.  The result-
ing decisions may leave both sides unhappy about some portion of the 
ruling.  In such cases, the parties might agree to interlocutory review if both 
believe the result will provide clarity and strengthen their position.  Finally, 
even in situations where one party clearly prevails on a particular ruling, the 
losing party might be willing to put enough money on the settlement table 
to convince the winner to agree to interlocutory review.  For example, con-
sider a defendant that loses a motion for summary judgment.  The defendant 
may wish to immediately appeal this decision and would likely not settle 
without such an appeal.  But the plaintiff would likely not agree to interlo-
cutory review, having just won at an important stage of the litigation.  The 
defendant could, however, offer to settle, with the full amount of the settle-
ment being determined by the result of the interlocutory appeal.226 
We recognize that the greater the likely incidence of agreed-upon re-
view, the more likely appellate courts will oppose our proposal.  As a gen-
eral matter, appellate courts have experienced greater growth in their 
dockets in recent years than have the district courts.227  To cope, appellate 
 
223  See Anthony, 106 F.R.D. 461. 
224  See Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might 
Do to Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1321, 1322–26 (1994) (noting the impact of technology on 
reducing costs to the courts of appeals and to litigants themselves). 
225  See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1260, 111th Cong. § 10(b) (2009) (allowing in-
terlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. Res. 515, 111th Cong. 
§ 8(b)(3) (2009) (allowing interlocutory appeals of claim construction rulings “if the district court finds 
that there is a sufficient evidentiary record and an immediate appeal from the order (A) may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, or (B) will likely control the outcome of the case, un-
less such certification is clearly erroneous”).  As finally enacted, the patent reform legislation did not 
include these or similar provisions.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 (2011). 
226  Parties to such agreements may agree to seek interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
See, e.g., John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009).  As discussed previously, how-
ever, the appellate court has the discretion to refuse to take such appeals.  See supra note 14. 
227  See POSNER, supra note 83, at 100–01 tbl.4.2 (reporting that civil cases filed in district courts 
grew 372% between 1960 and 1983 whereas civil cases filed in courts of appeals grew 823% and that 
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courts have adopted a variety of measures: they have increased their re-
liance on per curiam dispositions,228 granted fewer oral arguments,229 re-
leased fewer opinions for publication as fully precedential,230 and made 
greater efforts to resolve matters through alternative dispute resolution.231  
The fact that appellate courts have experienced greater docket growth in re-
cent years surely helps to explain their reluctance to accept certified ques-
tions for interlocutory review under § 1292(b).232  We can predict that our 
proposal, in omitting any provision for the appellate court to screen appeals, 
will prove somewhat controversial among appellate judges. 
Yet we worry that the introduction of another screening mechanism 
would undermine a central purpose of our proposal.233  As we explained at 
the outset, our proposal to rely on the parties to identify issues for interlocu-
tory appellate review offers the advantages of both categorical and discre-
tionary review.  Categorical review avoids the necessity for appellate 
screening,234 a practice that can often consume scarce appellate resources 
 
cases filed in district courts dropped 1% between 1983 and 1995 whereas cases filed in courts of appeals 
grew another 67%). 
228  The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 64.1% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unsigned.  JAMES C. DUFF, 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 42 tbl.S-3 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusines
pdfversion.pdf [hereinafter 2009 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
229  The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 71.5% of cases were terminated on the merits without oral argument.  Id. at 
40 tbl.S-1.  This is compared with 59.9% of cases for the same period in 1997.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS, 1997 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-1 (1998), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/1997/tables/s01sep97.pdf; see also POSNER, 
supra note 83, at 161–62 (discussing “the curtailment of both the length and the frequency of oral argu-
ment”). 
230  The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reported that for the twelve-month period 
ending September 30, 2009, 83.2% of decisions of the courts of appeals were unpublished.  See 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 228, at 42 tbl.S-3; see also POSNER, supra note 83, at 162–75 (discussing 
the increasing use of unpublished opinions as a means for reducing appellate workloads); Patricia M. 
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 
1373–74 (1995) (noting that many unpublished decisions “would have been the subject of full-fledged 
opinions a few decades ago”). 
231  See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 33 (“The court may direct the attorneys—and, when appropriate, the 
parties—to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter that may aid in disposing of the 
proceedings, including simplifying the issues and discussing settlement.”); ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A 
SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 3 (2006) (“All thirteen federal courts of appeals have imple-
mented appellate mediation or settlement programs, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.”); cf. 
supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
232  See supra note 14. 
233 With the rise of unpublished opinions and the decline of oral argument, see supra notes 228, 229, 
appellate courts have ample power to manage their dockets. 
234  See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text. 
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without producing any decision on the merits of a divisive legal issue.  Dis-
cretionary review tends to target issues that deserve appellate attention,235 
but it also imposes a screening burden on either the trial or appellate court.  
By relying on the parties to identify issues deserving of interlocutory review 
and on the district court to ensure that systemic interests receive due atten-
tion, our proposal offers some of the advantages of both approaches.236  In-
troduction of a layer of appellate screening would complicate the process of 
docketing an appeal and raise the cost of appellate review to the parties by 
requiring them to brief both the discretionary issue and the merits.  It 
would, moreover, enable the appellate courts to narrow access to their 
dockets, thus duplicating the disappointing results that have obtained under 
§ 1292(b)’s provision for certified review. 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to the relaxation of the final judgment rule, much else has 
changed since the nineteenth century, and much of this change was foreseen 
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.  While Justice Holmes denied that 
“[g]eneral propositions” could decide “concrete cases,”237 he also observed 
that judges work by induction, reasoning from the bottom up.  By this, Jus-
tice Holmes meant that judges draw their general principles from the con-
sensus reflected in prior decisions.238  Justice Holmes thus described a 
process of generalization that bears some resemblance to what we observe 
today as courts and legislatures insistently go about the business of trans-
forming issues of fact into matters of law.  With this modern shift towards 
judicialization, we observe an accompanying demand for judicial disposi-
tions; juries can no longer provide decisive answers to many of the ques-
tions that divide litigating parties. 
With the rise of general principles, the growing cost of trial practice, 
and the preference for settlement in the shadow of the law, parties increa-
singly demand access to appellate review at all stages of the litigation.  We 
can see this growing demand reflected in the many tools of interlocutory 
review that courts and rulemakers have already made available to the par-
ties.  These tools represent a significant departure from the nineteenth cen-
tury’s final judgment rule, which rather inflexibly barred any prejudgment 
 
235  See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
236  See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
237  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
238  In perhaps his best known aphorism, Justice Holmes proclaimed, “The life of the law has not 
been logic: it has been experience.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar 
Ass’n 2009) (1881).  In rejecting deductive logic, Holmes was arguing for induction, or bottom-up rea-
soning, as the key to the development of general principles.  He found merit in the common law because 
“it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes, 
and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870).  For all his skepticism about logic, Justice 
Holmes remained quite keen on the importance of identifying general principles; he simply rejected the 
syllogism as the basis for their derivation. 
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appellate oversight of actions for monetary damages.  Rather than inhabit a 
world of inflexible finality, we now inhabit a world of presumptive but epi-
sodic finality, where arguments for exceptions to the final judgment rule re-
ceive respectful attention. 
In this Article, we have argued that the parties should be given a meas-
ure of control over their own access to interlocutory review.  Parties will, 
needless to say, refuse to agree on such review in the great majority of cas-
es; plaintiffs will likely reject interlocutory appeals that they regard as more 
likely to delay the case than to contribute to its resolution.  But in cases 
where a question of law strikes the parties as one that could go either way, 
when the question of law can invalidate or reconfigure much of what lies 
ahead in the trial court, and when the cost of appellate review seems modest 
in relation to the cost of preparing the case for submission to the jury, par-
ties will have good reason to seek an early appellate court answer to the 
question.  We have argued that, for systemic reasons, this precise category 
of questions will almost always warrant interlocutory review.  We thus sug-
gest a rule that would authorize a district court to certify an issue for inter-
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